Thomas Jefferson and Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Dreams from two founding fathers


By Akbar Ahmed

Mohammad Ali Jinnah
"You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship. . . . We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state."

These are the words of a founding father -- but not one of the founders that America will be celebrating this Fourth of July weekend. They were uttered by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, founder of the state of Pakistan in 1947 and the Muslim world's answer to Thomas Jefferson.

When Americans think of famous leaders from the Muslim world, many picture only those figures who have become archetypes of evil (such as Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden) or corruption (such as Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf). Meanwhile, many in the Muslim world remember American leaders such as George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, whom they regard as arrogant warriors against Islam, or Bill Clinton, whom they see as flawed and weak. Even President Obama, despite his rhetoric of outreach, has seen his standing plummet in Muslim nations over the past year.

Blinded by anger, ignorance or mistrust, people on both sides see only what they wish to see, what they expect to see.

Despite the continents, centuries and cultures separating them, Jefferson and Jinnah, the founding fathers of two nations born from revolution, can help break this impasse. In the years following Sept. 11, 2001, their worlds collided, but the things the two men share far outweigh that which divides them.



Each founding father, inspired by his own traditions but also drawing from the other's, concluded that society is best organized on principles of individual liberty, religious freedom and universal education. With their parallel lives, they offer a useful corrective to the misguided notion of a "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West.

Thomas Jefferson
Jefferson is at the core of the American political ideal. As one biographer wrote, "If Jefferson was wrong, America is wrong. If America is right, Jefferson was right." Similarly, Jinnah is Pakistan. For most Pakistanis, he is "The Modern Moses," as one biography of him is titled.

The two were born subjects of the British Empire, yet both led successful revolts against the British and made indelible contributions to the identities of their young nations. Jefferson's drafting of the Declaration of Independence makes him the preeminent interpreter of the American vision; Jinnah's first speeches to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1947, from which his statement on freedom of religion is drawn, are equally memorable and eloquent testimonies. As lawyers first and foremost, Jefferson and Jinnah revered the rule of law and the guarantee of key citizens' rights, embodied in the founding documents they shaped, reflecting the finest of human reason.

Particularly revealing is the overlap in the two men's intellectual influences. Jefferson's ideas flowed from the European Enlightenment, and he was inspired by Aristotle and Plato. But he also owned a copy of the Koran, with which he taught himself Arabic, and he hosted the first White House iftar, the meal that breaks the daily fast during the Muslim holy days of Ramadan.

And while Jinnah looked to the origins of Islam for political inspiration -- for him, Islam above all emphasized compassion, justice and tolerance -- he was steeped in European thought. He studied law in London, admired Prime Minister William Gladstone and Abraham Lincoln, and led the creation of Pakistan without advocating violence of any kind.

In political life, the two suffered accusations of inconsistency: Jefferson for not being robust in defending Virginia from an invading British fleet with Benedict Arnold in command; Jinnah for abandoning his role as ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity and becoming the champion of Pakistan.

The controversies did not end with their deaths. Jefferson's views on the separation of church and state generated animosity in his own time and as recently as this year, when the Texas Board of Education dropped him from a list of notable political thinkers. Meanwhile, hard-line Islamic groups have long condemned Jinnah as a kafir, or nonbeliever; "Jinnah Defies Allah" was the subtitle of an exposé in the December 1996 issue of the London magazine Khilafah, a publication of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, one of Britain's leading Muslim radical groups. (Jinnah's sin, according to the author, was his insistence that Islam stood for democracy and supported women's and minority rights.)

But today such opinions are marginal ones, and the founders' many contributions are commemorated with must-see national monuments -- the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, Jinnah's mausoleum in Karachi -- that affirm their standing as national heroes.


If anything, it is Jefferson and Jinnah who might be critical. If they could contemplate their respective nations today, they would share distress over the acceptance of torture and suspension of certain civil liberties in the former; and the collapse of law and order, resurgence of religious intolerance and widespread corruption in the latter. Their visions are more relevant than ever as a challenge and inspiration for their compatriots and admirers in both nations.

Jefferson and Jinnah do not divide civilizations; they bridge them.

akbar@american.edu
Akbar Ahmed is the Ibn Khaldun chair of Islamic studies at American University's School of International Service. This essay is adapted from his new book, "Journey Into America: The Challenge of Islam."

Interview of Muhammad Ali Jinnah with Doon Campbell, Reuters' Correspondent, New Delhi, 21st May 1947

Mr. Jinnah talking to Louis Fischer of Time magazine in 1945

Doon Campbell: What sort of relationship do you envisage between Pakistan and Hindustan?

Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Friendly and reciprocal in the mutual interest of both. That is why I have been urging: let us separate in a friendly way and remain friends thereafter.

Doon Campbell: How would you divide the armed forces? Do you envisage a defence pact or any other kind of military alliance between Pakistan and Hindustan?

Muhammad Ali Jinnah: All the armed forces must be divided completely, but I do envisage an alliance, pact or treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan again in the mutual interest of both and against any aggressive outsider.

Doon Campbell: Do you favour a federation of Pakistan states even if there is to be partition of Punjab and Bengal?


Muhammad Ali Jinnah: The new clamour for partition that is stated is by the vocal section of the caste Hindus in Bengal and the Sikhs in particular in the Punjab will have disastrous results if those two provinces are partitioned and the Sikhs in the Punjab will be the greatest sufferers; and Muslims under contemplated Western Punjab will no doubt be hit, but it certainly will deal the greatest blow to those, particularly the Sikhs, for whose benefit the new stunt has been started. Similarly in Western Bengal, caste Hindus will suffer the most and so will the caste Hindus in Eastern Punjab.

This idea of partition is not only thoughtless and reckless, but if unfortunately His Majesty’s Government favour it, in my opinion it will be a grave error and will prove dangerous immediately and far more so in the future. Immediately it will lead to bitterness and unfriendly attitude between Eastern Bengal and Western Bengal and same will the case with torn Punjab, between Western Punjab and Eastern Punjab.

Partition of Punjab and Bengal, if effected, will no doubt weaken Pakistan to a certain extent. Weak Pakistan and a strong Hindustan will be a temptation the strong Hindustan to try to dictate. I have always said that Pakistan must be sufficiently strong as a balance vis-à-vis Hindustan. I am therefore, deadly against the partition of Bengal and the Punjab and we shall fight every inch against it.

Doon Campbell: Will you demand a corridor through Hindustan connecting the Eastern and Western Pakistan States?

Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Yes.


Doon Campbell: Do you envisage the formation of a Pan-Islamic state stretching from the Far and Middle East to the Far East after the establishment of Pakistan?


Muhammad Ali Jinnah: The theory of Pan-Islamism has long ago exploded, but we shall certainly establish friendly relations and cooperate for mutual good and world peace and we shall always stretch our hand of friendship to the near and Middle East and Far East after the establishment of Pakistan.

Doon Campbell: On what basis will the central administration of Pakistan be set up? What will be the attitude of this Government to the Indian States?

Muhammad Ali Jinnah: The basis of the central administration of Pakistan and that of the units to be set up will be decided no doubt, by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. But the Government of Pakistan can only be a popular representative and democratic form of Government. Its Parliament and Cabinet responsible to the Parliament will both be finally responsible to the electorate and the people in general without any distinction of caste, creed or sect, which will the final deciding factor with regard to the policy and programme of the Government that may be adopted from time to time.

As regards our attitude towards Indian States I may make it clear once more that the policy of the Muslim League has been and is not to interfere with the Indian States with regard to their internal affairs. But while we expect as rapid a progress as possible in the various states towards the establishment of full responsible government, it is primarily the concern of the ruler and his people.

As regards the position of the states in the light of the announcement made by His Majesty’s Government embodied in the White Paper of the 20th of February, I wish to make it clear that the states are at liberty to form a confederation as one solid group or confederate into more than one groups, or stand as individual states. It is a matter entirely for them to decide. And it is clear, as I can understand, that paramountcy is going to terminate and, therefore, they are completely independent and free. It is for them to adjust such a matter as there may be by virtue of their treaties and agreements with the paramount power. They must consider as completely independent and free states, free from any paramountcy, as to what is best in their interest and it will be open to them to decide whether they should join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly – Constituent Assemblies must be and will be two sovereign Constituent Assemblies of Pakistan and Hindustan.


Doon Campbell: In general terms what will be the foreign policy of Pakistan? Will it apply for membership of the United Nations?


Muhammad Ali Jinnah: The foreign policy of Pakistan can only be for peace and friendly relations with all other nations and we shall certainly play our part in the membership of the United Nations.

Doon Campbell: On which major power is Pakistan most likely to lean?

Muhammad Ali Jinnah: The one that will be in our best interests. It will not be a case of leaning to any power, but we shall certainly establish friendship and alliances which will be for the benefit of all those who may enter into such an alliance.

Doon Campbell: What sort of relationship do you envisage between Pakistan and Britain?


Muhammad Ali Jinnah: The question can only be decided by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and as I understand the situation, a relationship between Pakistan and British can be established which will be really beneficial for both. Pakistan cannot live in isolation, nor can any other nation do so today. We shall have choose our friends and I trust, wisely.

Doon Campbell: What are your views in regard to the protection of minorities in Pakistan territories?

Muhammad Ali Jinnah: There is only one answer: The minorities must be protected and safeguarded. The minorities in Pakistan will be the citizens of Pakistan and enjoy all the rights, privileges and obligations of citizenship without any distinction of caste creed or sect.

They will be treated justly and fairly. The Government will run the administration and control the legislative measures by its Parliament, and the collective conscience of the Parliament itself will be a guarantee that the minorities need not have any apprehension of any injustice being done to them. Over and above that there will be provisions for the protection and safeguard of the minorities which in my opinion must be embodied in the constitution itself. And this will leave no doubt as to the fundamental rights of the citizens, protection of religion and faith of every section, freedom of thought and protection of their cultural and social life. - API




Q & A text sourced from photocopy of original: Dawn, 22nd May 1947 (with thanks to Mr. Inamullah Khawaja). See also copy in Zaidi, Z.H. (ed) (1993) Jinnah Papers: Prelude to Pakistan, Vol. I Part I. Lahore: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, p.845, which was obtained from an original typewritten document containing corrections in Jinnah’s own handwriting as well as his signature. Thanks to Jinnah Archives dot com

A Pakistani View

by S.M. Ikram

 

On the occasion of the All India Muslim League session, 1936 On the occasion of the All India Muslim League session, 1936

Jinnah was not invited to the later sessions of the Round Table Conference, but he was now residing in England, and had opportunities of meeting the delegates from India. An important contact, which he effectively renewed during this period was with Sir Muhammad Iqbal, who had come as a delegate to the Round Table Conference. Jinnah was the principal speaker at a reception given in honour of the poet by Iqbal Literary Association and thereafter invited him to lunch at his house. Thus began a series of meetings which were to leave a mark on the course of India’s history. Jinnah was not now a delegate to the Round Table Conference, but during the first session, which he attended, he had criticised to conception of the central federation, which other delegates had supported enthusiastically. His objections were partly from the nationalist anglet (sic) – the inclusion of the autocratic princes at the centre would “water down democracy” – and partly from the Muslim point of view – a strong centre would nullify the provincial autonomy which the Muslims valued so much. Iqbal, on the other hand, had a few years before, held out his plan for a Muslim bloc in the North-West. This did not receive much consideration at the Round Table Conference, but the separation of Sind, and grant of full reforms to the North-West Frontier Province were bound to pave the way for its fulfillment. This plan, the poet discussed at length with Jinnah, and gradually convinced him that in this lay the only hope for a contented, peaceful India in general and for the bulk of Indian Muslims in particular.

Jinnah (2nd from left) Iqbal had got Jinnah seriously interested in what came to be known as the “Pakistan Scheme” but even then he did not return to India to take it up. He was biding his time, and all the time, most unhappy. During the course of a brief visit to Oxford in 1932, he said to the present writer, with great anguish of soul, “but what is to be done? The Hindus are short-sighted and I think, incorrigible. The Muslim camp is full of those spineless people who, whatever they may say to me, will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do! Where is, between these two groups, any place for a man like me?”

Meanwhile he was getting reports from India that Indian Muslims were a flock of sheep without a shepherd. The Aga Khan’s leadership was ineffective, as he wanted the palm without the dust, and could not give up the health resorts of France and Switzerland. Maulana Muhammad Ali was dead. So was Sir Muhammad Shafi, and even if he had been alive, he was too closely associated with a pro-British policy to inspire general enthusiasm. The League and the Muslim Conference had become the plaything of petty leaders who would not resign office, even after a vote of no-confidence! And, of course, they had no organization in the provinces, and no influence with the masses.

It was in these circumstances that certain well-wishers of the Muslims turned towards Jinnah. They requested him to return to India, and once again lead to army, which was first becoming a rabble. Iqbal joined in these appeals. Jinnah relented, but even now he would only visit India for a few months and return to England again. In 1934, however, he was elected the permanent president of the All-India Muslim League, and finally returned to India in October, 1935.

Back in India, Jinnah began to reorganize the All-India Muslim League. Its annual session was held at Bombay in April 1936, under the presidentship of Sir Wazir Hasan, and its constitution was revised to make it more democratic and living organization. Steps were also taken, for the first time, to set up a machinery for contesting elections on behalf of the Muslim League. A central election board with provincial elections under the Government of India Act of 1935. Jinnah toured the country to convass (sic) support for the League candidates, but his efforts were only partially successful. In the Punjab, he had the constant support of Iqbal, but could not come to an agreement with Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, the Unionist leader and League fared very badly in that ‘key’ province. Experience in Bengal was similar. In the elections, the League was actively assisted by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, and had generally the goodwill of the Congress, which had been receiving support for Jinnah’s Independent Party in the Central legislative Assembly, but it failed to make much headway against firmly entrenched provincial parities.

The Rallying-Post

The provincial elections of 1937 produced many surprises. The League had not come out with flying colours. The Congress, on the other hand, achieved a success, which neither its supporters nor its opponents had anticipated. Most provincial Governors and British officials expected at the provincial election a repetition of the previous elections to the Central Legislature, when Congress had won about 50 per cent of the Hindu seats. They looked to the provincial parites, which they had encouraged in various areas – the Unionists in Punjab, the Justice Party in Madras, the Zamindars in the Nationalist Party in U.P., the Marathas in Bombay – and were sure that although the Congress may be the largest single party, it would have to depend on others to form ministries. Here they were to be completely disillusioned. The organizing ability of Sardar Vallabhbhi Patel, who had succeeded Dr. Ansari as the Chairman of the Parliamentary Board, the army of the workers, which the Congress had built up during the previous twenty years, the magic name of Mahatma, and the whirlwind tours of the president, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, completely upset the official calculations. The Congress triumphed in all the Hindu provinces and even in the North-West Frontier!

There is no doubt that this unexpected success went to the head of the Congress leaders. Before and even during the elections, they were friendly to the Muslim League. Now they were cold and distant. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru declared at Calcutta that there were only two parties in the country – the British and the Congress. The League had fared so badly at the elections that it was not necessary to acknowledge its existence. To this attitude of high disdain, two other factors contributed. The Congress president was surrounded by certain left wing – almost de-Muslimised – Muslims, who later left even the Congress fold for the Communists’ ranks. They urged on Nehru, that it was “medieval” to recognize political parties based on religions, and the Congress had only to organize a vigorous Muslim Mass Contact Movement to achieve the same success amongst the Muslims, which it had gained among the Hindus. Nehru was carried away by these visions, and an open breach occurred between the Congress and the League. While in the original elections, the Congress had supported the League in U.P. now it set up a candidate to oppose the Muslim League in Bhraich constituency of U.P. which had returned a Leaguer, who died shortly after the elections.

The personality of the chairman of the Congress parliamentary board was another factor, which drove the Congress away from the League. Sardar Patel was a great organizer but for a man of his ability and importance, he was amazingly ill-informed about the background of Muslim politics, and even otherwise perhaps freedom from communalism was not one of his many gifts. He was at this time at the summit of the Congress parliamentary board, bossed over all government in the Congress provinces. He had to decide the question of Muslim representation in provincial government, and he dealt with the problem in his usual firm and unimaginative way. If he had faced the question in a spirit of statesmanship, he could have seen that Sir Sikandar Hayat and other Muslim premiers had already tackled the corresponding Hindu problem in the Muslim provinces, in a manner which could be a very safe guide to the Congress. Sir Sikandar Hayat’s party was in absolute majority in the Punjab Assembly, but he offered the Hindu seat in the Government to the Hindu Mahasabha, and although Raja Narendara Nath, the president of the Hindu Party, was unable to accept it owing to old age, his nominee, Sir Manohar Lal was appointed a minister. There was really no other way to give honest, real, representation to the minorities. If a minister had to be taken not on account of affiliation to the party, or any other personal claim, but to represent the minorities, it was obvious that he should be their genuine representative and not a stooge of the party in power. This the iron-willed Sardar would not – or could not – grasp. Under the constitution, representation had to be given to the minorities. So he was prepared to have Muslim ministers even from the Muslim League – but then, they must resign from the League, sign the Congress pledge, and abide by its discipline. In other words, the minority representatives were not to represent the minorities but the Congress! In imposing his iron discipline, the Sardar had some initial difficulties. The Muslim League had not done well in predominantly Muslim areas, but it had won the vast majority of seats in the Congress provinces. In some of these – like Bombay – not a single Muslim had been returned on the Congress ticket. So what was to be done about the representation of the Muslims in the Governments of these provinces? The problem was somewhat complicated but the efficient, resourceful Sardar was not going to be baffled by these difficulties. He offered the ministry to any Tom, Dick or Harry amongst the Muslim members who was prepared to sign the Congress pledge and so the farce of Muslim representation was complete.

The procedure adopted was, of course, a negation of the constitutional safeguards for the Muslims, but it was also less than fair to the Muslim League. Before the elections the Congress and Jinnah’s Independent Party had closely collaborated with each other in the Central Legislative Assembly and many Congress resolutions against the Government succeeded only on account of Jinnah’s support. Their relations during the elections were also friendly. Later, when after the elections in 1937, the Congress at first refused to accept office, and the Governors called the League leaders, as representing the next largest party, to form what we called interim Ministries Jinnah would not allow this. It is known that in some cases, the leaders of the League parties in the provincial legislatures e.g. Sir Ali Mohammad Khan Dehlavi in Bombay were quite willing – even keen – to become premiers but Jinnah overruled them. He would not profit by the Congress refusal to come in, or do anything, which might jeopardise the prospects of an effective League-Congress collaboration on which his heart was set.

The Congress party leaders, however, when it was their turn to be invited by the Governors, completely ignored the Muslim League. This must have hurt Jinnah; what followed was calculated to rouse his ire still further. The Congress Government had taken one false step in taking, as Muslim Ministers, persons who did not command the confidence of the Muslims in the legislature. This false step was succeeded by many more of the same type. In the absence of a true Muslim representative in the Cabinet, the congress Government had nobody to advise them about the views of the Muslims, when they took decision affecting the general population. The so-called “Muslim Minister” knew very well that he was governed by the Congress pledge, and the iron discipline of that party. He usually represented himself alone, and lacked that moral courage which comes from having “big battalions at one’s back.” In many cases, he was just a newcomer to the Congress ranks, avowedly for the sake of the office – and did not carry with his colleague in the Cabinet, anything of the influence which a Syed Mahmud or Yaqub Hassan would carry. Bereft of any following, and any mission, that he was to watch the Muslim interests – and in many cases, even the support of a contented conscience – the Muslim Minister was a pathetic figure, and deprived of his frank advice, the Congress Governments took several steps, which caused deep resentment amongst the Muslims – as well as by Hindu untouchables – and a committee has reported on the hardships, to which Muslims were exposed under the Congress rule.

The second half of the year 1937 was one of the darkest periods through which Indian Muslims have had to pass since 1857. Their central political organization had failed to show any effectiveness at the polls. Over the greater part of the country, where the Congress ministries held sway, they felt that the Hindu Raj had come. They suddenly realized that all the fears, which Sir Syed and Viqar-ul-Mulk had expressed about their future, were coming true. They were most disheartened and sore at heart. They saw no way out of their predicament, and thought that soon the Congress, with its vast organization, and the policy of corrupting a few ambitious, un-principled Muslims, would extend its sway over the Muslim majority provinces and the while country would be come a vast prison-house for them.

The prospects for the Muslims were most gloomy and many faint hearts began to suggest that they should settle with the Congress on its own terms. There was however one light which burned bright and clear. Jinnah has been called a proud and haughty person, and this trait of character may have caused him as his people occasional difficulties. This was, however, the time when just these qualities were needed. In the midst of the storm he stood like a rock. He was the proud representative of a proud people and he hurled defiance at the pretensions and the dreams of the Congress. He was not going to lower his flag to come to terms with the Congress. Far from his accepting conditions while being offered seats in the Congress Governments, it would be he, who would impose conditions!

Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Allama Sir Dr Mohammad Iqbal

Indian Muslims are not likely to forget the resolve stand which Jinnah, without any visible following, without much support in the legislatures, and inspired solely by his sense of duty and his faith in his people, took at this juncture. But there was another great Muslim who, although in the background, gave Jinnah powerful and effective moral support. Jinnah had written about Iqbal.

“To me he was a friend, guide and philosopher, and during the darkest moments through which the Muslim League had to go, he stood like a rock and never flinched one single moment.”

Gradually the darkness began to lift. The Muslims saw the light and rallied round. Those in the Muslim majority provinces saw what was happening to their co-religionists in the Congress provinces and were deeply touched. They now realised that except through a powerful, All-India organization they had no means of saving themselves. So after having decisively defeated the League in the elections, the Muslim premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Sind, came to terms with Jinnah and agreed to abide by the policy and decisions of All-India Muslim League in all-India matters.

Jinnah with Raja of Mahmudabad These decisions which were announced at the annual sessions of the League, held at Lucknow, toward end of 1937, not only opened a new chapter for the League but marked a turning point in the history of Muslim India. The session was held in the face of heavy odds but, thanks to the help of the young Raja of Mahmudabad the arrangements were perfect, Jinnah, in his presidential address hurled defiance at the Congress, but now it was not the defiance of one who had nothing but faith and courage, to succour him. He had the premier of the Punjab and Bengal on his right and left and he knew that he had the support of almost every selfrespecting Muslim. The Muslim India had relied the round the rallying-post!

Search For Security

The significance of the Lucknow session of the League was not on the Congress leaders. They realize that their treatment of the Muslims in the Congress provinces had been taken as a challenge by the entire Muslim India, which was prepared to meet it. The firm, disciplinarian policy of the iron dictator – the Sardar – had given results, quite different from what he expected. Thinking Hindus began to criticize the want of statesmanship shown by the Congress leadership in dealing with the Muslims. Tairsee, president of Hindu Gymkhana of Bombay, criticised, in the columns of Bombay Chronicle, the unstatesmanlike attitude which the Congress leadership had shown in refusing genuine representation to the Muslims in Congress Cabinets. Sardar Sardhul Singh Caveeshar of the Punjab expressed the same view in a long letter to Mahatma Gandhi. Sir Chiman Lal Sitalved criticised the unhappy development in the presidential address delivered in December 1937 at Calcutta session of All-India Liberal Federation and contrasted the unwise rigidity shown by the Congress leaders with the statesmanship displayed by the Muslim premier like Sir Sikandar Hayat.

The Congress leaders realized that they had blundered and appeared willing to take Muslim representatives in the Congress Cabinet on less exacting terms. Now it was Jinnah’s turn to be firm and unbending. The numerous unity talks which started between him and the Congress leaders, usually broke down on the question of the representative character of the Muslim League. His plea was that in 1916, when alone there was an agreement between Hindus and Muslims, the League had been taken as the sole and the authoritative representative of the Muslims and the Congress should now acknowledge its position in the same way. This, the Congress considered incompatible with its claim of speaking on behalf of entire India, and the negotiations broke down. Perhaps the truth in that what had happened in 1937, had not only embittered Jinnah but had finally convinced him that there was no safety for the Muslims in the goodwill of the Congress or the Hindus.

S.M. Ikram was a member of the Indian civil service and after partition held a number of important positions in the civil service of Pakistan. He has also published books in both Urdu and English on a variety of topics related to the history and culture of the Muslims of the subcontinent. In the excerpt quoted above, taken from a series of biographical sketches of Indian Muslim leaders, he discusses of the re-organization of the Muslim League in the thirties under the leadership of Jinnah.

Source: Muhammad Ali Jinnah Makers of Modern Pakistan. Edited by: Sheila McDonough (Sir George Williams University) D.C. Health and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, USA.

Letters from Allama Iqbal to Quaid-e-Azam

Allama Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

23rd May, 1936

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you so much for your letter which I received a moment ago. I am glad to see that your work is progressing. I do hope that the Punjab parties-specially the Ahrar and the Ittihad Millat-will eventually, after some bickering, join you. A very enthusiastic and active member of the Ittihad told me so a few days ago. About M. Zafar Ali Khan the Ittihad people do not themselves feel sure. However there is plenty of time yet, and we shall soon see how the electorate generally feels about the Ittihad sending their men to the Assembly.

Hoping you are well and looking forward to meeting you.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Lahore

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9th June, 1936

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am sending you my draft. Also a cutting from the Eastern Times of yesterday. This is a letter from an Intelligent Pleader of Guradspur.

I hope the statement issued by the Board will fully argue the whole scheme and will meet all the objection is so far advanced against it. It must frankly state as present position of the Indian Muliins as regards both the Government and the Hindus. It must warn the Muslims of India that unless the present scheme is adopted the Muslims will lose all that they have gained during the last 15 years and will seriously harm, and in fact, shatter their own solidarity with their own hands.

Yours etc.,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

p.s. Will feel much obliged if you send the statement to me before it is sent to the press.

Another point which should be brought out in the statement is as follows:

1. Indirect election to the Central Assembly has made it absolutely essential that Muslim representatives returned to the Provincial Assemblies should be bound by an All-India Muslim policy and programme so that they should return to the Central Assembly only those Muslims who would be pledged to support the specific Muslim questions connected with the Central subjects and arising out of their position as the Second great nation of India. Those who are now for Provincial policies and programme were themselves instrumental in getting in direct elections for the Central Assembly introduced into the constitution obviously because this suited a foreign Government. Now when the community wants to make the best use of this misfortune (i.e indirect elections) by proposing an all-India scheme of elections (e.g. League scheme) to be adhered to by the Provincial candidates the same men, again, at the instance of a foreign Government have come out to defeat the community in their effort to retain its solidarity as a nation.

2. Question of Wakf Law arising out of Shahidganj, culture, language, mosque and personal law.

Private and Confidential,

Lahore

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25th June 1936

My dear Mr. Jinnah

Sir Sikandar Hayat left Lahore a day or two ago. I think he will meet you at Bombay and have a talk with you about certain matters of importance. Daultana saw me yesterday evening. He tells me that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party are prepared to make the following declaration

“That in all matters specific to the Muslim community as an all-India minority they will be bound by the decision of the League and will never make any pact with any nom-Muslims group in the Provincial Assembly.”

“Provided the League (Provincial) makes the following declaration:

That those returned to the Provincial Assembly on the League ticket will co-operate with that party or group which has the largest number of Muslims’.”

Please let me know at your earliest convenience what you think of this proposal. Also let me know the result of your talk with Sir Sikandar Hayat. If you succeed in convincing him he may come to our side.

Hoping you are well,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Mayo Road, Lahore

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23rd August, 1936

M dear Mr. Jinnah,

I hope my letter reached you all right. There is some talk of an understanding between the Punjab Parliamentary Bard and the Unionist Party. I should like you to let me know what you think of such a compromise and to suggest conditions for the same. I read in the papers that you have brought about a compromise between the Bengal Proja Party and the Parliamentary Board. I should like to know the terms and the conditions. Since the Proja Party is non-communal like the Unionist, your compromise in Bengal may be helpful to you.

Hoping you are well,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Strictly Confidential.

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20th March 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah

I suppose you have read Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s address to the All-India National Convention and that you fully realise the policy under-lying it in so far as Indian Muslims are concerned. I believe you are also aware that the new constitution has at least bought a unique opportunity Indian Muslims for self-organisation in view of the future political developments both in India and Muslim Asia. While we re ready to co-operate with other Progressive Parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organisation of Indian Muslims. I therefore suggest that an effective reply should be given to the All-India National Convention. You should immediately hold an All-India Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new Provincial Assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this convention you must restate as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country. It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problem. If you could hold this Convention, it would test the credentials of those Muslim Legislators who have formed parties contrary to the aims and aspirations of Indian Muslims. It would farther make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural enilty. I am coming to Delhi in a few days time and hope to have a talk with you on this important matter. I shall be staying in the Afghan Consulate. If you could spare a few moments we should meet there. Please drop a line in reply to this letter a early as possible.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

p. s. Please excuse me. I have got this letter written by a friend as my eyesight is getting bad.

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22nd April 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah

I do not know whether my letter which I posted to you about two weeks ago ever reached you. I posted it to your address at New Delhi and when I went to Delhi later I discovered that you had already left Delhi. In that letter I proposed that we should hold immediately an All-India Muslim Convention, say at Delhi, and once more to restate the policy of Indian Muslims both to the Government and to the Hindus.

As the situation is becoming grave and the Muslim feeling in the Punjab is rapidly becoming pro-Congress for reasons which it is unnecessary to detail I would request you to consider and decide the matter as early as possible. The session of the All India Muslim League is postponed till August, and the situation demands an early restatement of the Musllm policy. If the Convention is preceded by a tour of prominent Muslim leaders, the meeting of the Convention is sure to be a great success. Please drop a line in reply to this letter as early as possible.

Yours sincerely

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

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Confidential,

28th May, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you so much for your letter which reached me in due course. I am glad to hear that you will bear in mind what I wrote to you about the changes in the constitution and programme of the League. I have no doubt that you fully realise the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned. The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far with good reason, taken no interest in it. Personally I believe that a political organisation which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim can not attract our masses.

Under the new constitution the higher posts go to the sons of upper classes; the smaller ones go to the friends or relatives of the ministers. In other matters too our political institution have never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally. The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League’s activity to solve this question. If the League can give no such promises I am sure that Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before. Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at last the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots. I fear that in certain parts of the country, e.g. N.-W. India, Palestine may be repeated. Also the insertion of Jawaharlal’s socialism into the body politic of Hinduism is likely to cause much bloodshed among the Hindus themselves. The issue between social democracy and Brahmanism is not dissimilar to the one between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Whether the fate of socialism will be the same as the fate of Buddhism in India I can not say. But it is clear to my mind that if Hinduism accepts social demopracy it must necessarily cease to be Hindaism. For Islam the acpeptance of social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam. The modern problems therefore are more easy to solve for the Muslims than for the Hindus. But as I have said above in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve the problems it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Don’t you think that the Lime for such a demand has already arrived? Perhaps this is the best reply you can give to the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru. Anyhow I have given you my own thoughts in the hope that you will give them serious consideration either in your address or in the discussions of the coming session of the League. Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Muhammad Iqbal

P.S. On the subject-matter of the letter I intended to Write to you a long and open letter in the press. But on further consideration I felt that the present moment was not suitable for such step.

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Private and Confidential,

June 21st, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you so much for your letter which I received yesterday. I know yan are a busy man; but I do hope you won’t mind my writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in India today to Whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming to North-West India, and perhaps to the Whole of India. I tell you that we are actually living in a state of civil war which, but for the police and military, would, become universal in no time. During the last few months there has been a series of Hindu-Muslim riots In India. In North-West India alone there have been at least three riots during the last three months and at least four cases of vilification of the Prophet by Hindus and Sikhs. In each of the four cases the vilifier has been murdered. There have also been cases of burning of the Quran in Sind. I have carefully studied the whole situation and believe that the real cause of these event is neither religious nor economic. It is purely political, i.e., the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to intermediate Muslims even in the Muslim majority provinces. And the new constitution is such that even in the Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims. The result is that the Muslim Ministry can take no proper action and are even driven to do injustice to Muslims partly to please those on whom they depend and partly to show that they are absolutely impartial. Thus it is clear that we have our specific reasons to reject this constitution. It seems to me that the new constitution is devised only to placate the Hindus. In the Hindu majority provinces, the Hindus have of course absolute majorities, and can ignore Muslims, altogether. In Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on Hindus. I have no doubt in my mind that this constitution is calculated to do infinite harm to the Indian Muslims. Apart from this it is no solution of the economic problem which is so acute among Muslims. The only thing that the communal award grants to Muslims is the recognition of their political existence in India. But such a recognition granted to a people whom this constitution does not and cannot help in solving their problem of poverty can be of no value to them. The Congress President has denied the political existence of Muslims in no unmistakable terms. The other Hindu political body, i.e., the Mahasabha, whom I regard as the real representative of the masses of the Hindus, has declared more than once that a united Hindu-Muslim nation is impossible in India. In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities. Many British statesmen also realise this, and the Hindu-Muslim riots which are rapidly coming in the wake of this constitution are sure further to open their eyes to the real situation in the country. I remember Lord Lothain told me before I left England that my scheme as the only possible solution of the troubles of India, but that it would take 25 years to come. Some Muslims in the Punjab are already suggesting the holding of a North-West Indian Muslim Conference, and the idea is rapidly spreading. I agree with you, however, that our community is not yet sufficiently organised and disciplined and perhaps the time for holding such a conference is not yet ripe. But I feel that it would be highly advisable for you to indicate in your address at least the line of action that the Muslims of North-West India would be finally driven to take.

To my mind the new constitution with its ides o a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nation entitled to Self-determination just as other nation as in India and outside India are?

Personally I think that the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal ought are present to ignore Muslim minority provinces. This is th best course to adopt in the interest of both Muslim majority and minority provinces It will therefore be better to hold the coming session of the League in the Punjab, and not in a Muslim minority province. The monhth of August is bad in, Lahore. I think you should seriously consider the advisability of holding the coming session at Lahore in the middle of October when the weather is quite good in Lahore. The interest in the All-India Muslim League is rapidly growing in the Punjab, and the holding of the coming session in Lahore is likely to give a fresh political awakening to the Punjab Muslims.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

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11th August, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Events have made it abundantly clear that the League ought to concentrate all its activities on the North-West Indian Musalmans. The League office bf Delhi informed Mr. Ghulam Rasool that the dates of the sessions of the Muslim League have not been fixed as yet.

This being so I fear it will not be possible to hold the sessions in August and September. I, therefore, repeat my request that the League sessions may be held in Lahore in the middle or end of October. The enthusiasm for the League is rapidly increasing in the Punjab, and I have no doubt that the holding of the session in Lahore will be a turning point in the history of the League and an important step towards mass contact. Please drop a line in reply.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

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Private and Confidential

7th October, 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

A strong contingent from the Punjab is expected to attend The Lucknow Session of the League. The Unionist Muslims are also making preparations to attend under the leadership of Sir Sikandar Hayat. We are living in difficult times and the Indian Muslims expect that your address will give the clearest possible lead in all matters relating to the future of the community. I suggest that the League may state or restate its policy relating to the communal award in the shape of a suitable resolution. In the Punjab and I hear also in Sind attempts are being made by misguided Muslims themselves to alter it in the interests of the Hindus. Such men fondly believe that by pleasing the Hindus they will be able to retain their power. I personally believe that since the British Government wants to honour the Hindus who would welcome the upsetter of the communal award they (the British Government) are trying to get it upset through their Muslim agents.

I shall prepare a list of 28 persons for the vacancies in the League Council. Mr. Ghulain Rasool will show you this list. I do hope that this choice will be carefully made. Our men will leave Lahore on the 13th.

The Palestine question is very much agitating the minds of the Muslims. We have a very fine opportunity for mass contact for the purposes of the League. I have no doubt that the League will pass a strong resolution on this question and also by holding a private conference of the leaders decide on some sort of a positive action in which masses may share in large numbers. This will at once popularise the League and may help the Palestine Arabs. Personally I would not mind going to jail on an issue which affects both Islam and India. The formation bf a Western base on the very gates of the East is a menace to both.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

P.S. The League should resolve that no province should come to any understanding with other communities regarding the communal award. This is an All-India question and must be settled by the League alohe. Perhaps you may go further and say that the present atmosphere is not at all suitable for any communal understanding.

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Private and Confidential,

30th october; 1937

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

I suppose you have already read the resolution passed by the A.-I.C C. Your move in time has saved the situation, and we are all waiting for your observations on the Congress, resolution. The Tribune of Lahore has already criticised it and I believe Hindu opinion will generally be opposed to it. However it should not act as an opiate as far as Muslims are concerned. We must carry the work of organisation more vigorously than ever and should not rest till Muslim Governments are established in the five provinces and reforms are granted to Baluchistan.

The rumour is that part of the Unionist Party does not mean to sign the League creed. So far Sir Sikandar and his party have not signed it and I heard this morning that they would wait till the next sessions of the League. The idea as one of themselves told me, is to slacken the activities of the Provincial League. However I shall place you in possession of all the facts in a few days’ time and then ask your opinion as to how we should proceed. I do hope that before the Lahore Session you would be able to tour in the Punjab for at least two weeks.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

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Urgent

1st November 1937

My dear Mr Jinnah,

Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan with some of the members of his party saw me yesterday and we had a long talk about the differences between the League and the Unionist Party. Statements have been issued to the press by both sides. Each side putting its own interpretation on the terms of Jinnah-Sikandar agreement. This has caused much misunderstanding. As I wrote to you before, I will put you in possession of all those statements in a few days’ time. For the present I request you to kindly send me as early as possible a copy of the agreement which was signed by Sir Sikandar and which I am told is in your possession. I further want to ask you whether you agreed to the Provincial Parliamentary Board being controlled by the Unionist Party. Sir Sikandar tells me that you agreed to this and therefore he claims that the Unionist Party must have their majority in the Board. This as far as I know does not appear in the Jinnah-Sikandar agreement.

Please reply to this letter as early as possible. Our men are touring in the country and forming Leagues in various places. Last night we had a very successful meeting in Lahore. Others will follow.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

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Strictly Private & Confidential

10th Nov., 1937

My Dear Mr. Jinnah,

After having several talks with Sir Sikandar and his friends I am now definitely of the opinion that Sir Sikandar wants nothing less than the complete control of the League and the Provincial Parliamentary Board. In your pact with him it is mentioned that the Parliamentary Board will be reconstituted and that the Unionists will have majority in the Board. Sir Sikandar tells me that you agreed to their majority in the Board. I wrote to you some time ago to enquire whether you did agree to the unionist Majority in the Board. So far I have not heard from you. I personally see no harm in giving him the majority that he wants but he goes beyond the pact when he wants a complete change in the office holders of the League, especially the Secretary who has done so much for the League. He also wishes that the finances of the League should be controlled by his men. All this to my mind amounts to capturing of the League and then killing it. Knowing the opinion of the province as I do I cannot take the responsibility of handing over the League to Sir Sikandar and his friends. The pact has already damaged the prestige of the League in this province; and the tactics of the Unionists may damage it still further. They have not so far signed the creed of the League and I understand do not mean to. The session of the League in Lahore they want in April instead of February. My impression is, that they want to gain time for their own Zamindara League to function in the province. Perhaps you know that on his return from Lucknow Sir Sikandar constituted a Zamindara League whose branches are now being made in the province. In these circumstances please let me know what we should do. Kindly wire your view if possible. If this is not possible write a detailed letter as early as possible.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Mohammad, Iqbal

Bar-at-Law

__,_._,___

Foreign Policy of Pakistan: 1947-48

by Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar

Pakistan Foreign Office, Islamabad Pakistan came into being under most unfavourable circumstances. Few weeks before independence, anti-Muslim riots broke out in East Punjab and a number of adjoining princely states. The riots which were “long planned and directed from a very high level”, were nothing less than “a war of extermination against the Muslim minority”.1 Soon the riots spread to Delhi, where it became impossible for a Muslim “to move freely without risk to his life”.2 Consequently, millions of Muslims from India were forced to take refuge in Pakistan. The immediate problem of the Government of Pakistan, was, therefore, to provide them food and shelter. It was by no means an easy task for a state, which had literally started from a scratch. At the same time, the planned migration of the Hindus, who controlled the economic resources of the areas constituting Pakistan before independence, crippled Pakistan’s economy.

The problems of the new state were enhanced by the hostile policy of the Government of India. In October 1947, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck reported to the British Prime Minister Attlee: “The present Indian cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis”.3 To another foreign observer India seemed hell bent on “to destroy Pakistan as rapidly as possible so as to restore it to the dominion of Delhi”.4 Such conclusions were strengthened by actions of Government of India. For instance, India retained much of Pakistan’s share of the assets of the undivided India.5 She refused to deliver more than ninety seven percent of Pakistan’s share of military stores.6 The Government of India instructed its Reserve Bank (which according to an agreement made at the time of partition, was supposed to act as banker as currency authority both for India as Pakistan up to 1 October 1948) not to credit the Government of Pakistan with 550 million rupees of cash balance, which was due to her out of her share of 750 million rupees.7

The Indian occupation of the princely states of Junagadh, Manavader and Mangrol, which had acceded to Pakistan, and the dispatch of Indian troops to Jammu and Kashmir posed serious threat to the security of Pakistan. India seemed to be on war path. Even Gandhi, ‘the great apostle of non-violence’ talked about war with Pakistan.8

To deal effectively with these colossal internal problems and a hostile stronger neighbour the new state required a large army efficient and experience Civil Service. But at the time of independence , Pakistan had no army worth the name or even a civil service. In the latter category, in particular, there were not many senior officers. Amongst the officials who had ‘opted’ for Pakistan there was hardly any Muslim I.C.S. officer above the rank of a Deputy Secretary.

The situation in the newly created Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was even worse.9 Amongst the one hundred and fifty odd officials of the three major departments – the Political and State Department, the Department of External Affairs, and the Department of Commonwealth Relations – who came to the same of Pakistan, more than a third were peons. Among the officers only four Muslims and five British nationalists came to Pakistan. When the Foreign Office was established, there was only one Joint Secretary and two Deputy Secretaries and they were all British nationals. Later, two Muslim I.C.S. Officers who had served on the Partition Committee, were also taken in as a Deputy Secretaries. Ikramullah, who held the rank of a mere Deputy Secretary in the Government of India, was exalted to the position of Foreign Secretary. He had not experience of international relations or the working of a department dealing with external affairs. The result was that Joint Secretary, T.B. Creag Coen, who had served in the Indian Political Service, dominated the Foreign Office and his opinion was regarded as the last word.

Until December 1947, Pakistan did not have a full time Foreign Minister. Officially, Liaqat Ali Khan held the portfolio of External Affairs, but in practice all papers were put up to Quaid-i-Azam for information or decision. Quaid-i-Azam’s pre-occupation with internal problems and his failing health, did not give him to concentrate on foreign relations. Such a situation could not go on for long. Therefore, in December 1947, Zafarullah Khan, who had some experience in external affairs was appointed as Foreign Minister Zafarulla who had worked as Indian Political Agent in China, represented India in the U.N on Palestine Problem, and later on 1947 had led Pakistan’s delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. Still the policy decisions continued to rest with Quaid-i-Azam. Even during his last days at Ziarat, Ikramullah, the Foreign Secretary, regularly visited him to apprise the Quaid of the latest developments and to seek his guidance.

Due to shortage of trained personnel, Pakistan could not establish diplomatic relations with more than six countries. In the initial months Habib Rahimatulla was appointed High Commissioner in London and I.H. Ispahani, Aurangzeb Khan and I.I. Chundrigar as ambassadors to Washington, Rangoon and Kabul respectively. The embassies at Tehran and Cairo remained without ambassadors till 1948, when Raja Ghazanfar Ali and Abdul Sattar Seth presented their credentials. None of the ambassadors appointed had any experience in international politics and diplomacy.

Moreover in 1948 the Public Service Commission for the first time selected thirteen persons to be appointed as officers in Pakistan Foreign Service. In order to fill senior posts it was decided to induct officers from other departments. This group lacked experience in diplomacy and were of “uneven quality”.10 It could not be expected from these ‘diplomats’ sitting in the foreign office or serving in the mission to give a lead or even to assist the politicians in the formation of a foreign policy. No wonder, Pakistan in its first year, could not formulate a foreign policy.

However, it can be said that Pakistan carried over the policy of the All India Muslim League towards the Muslim world, and particularly towards Palestine. Muslim League’s policy was best stated by Quaid-i-Azam in October 1942, on the occasion of the Eid-ul-Fitar. He had declared: “while we are engaged in our struggle for freedom and independence, let us not forget our brethren who in other parts of the world are going likewise”.11 Regarding the Arabs he said: “The Muslims of India will stand solidly and will help the Arabs in every way they can in their brave and just struggle that they are carrying on against all odds”.12

Between 1933 and 1946 the Muslim League passed eighteen resolutions in support of the Muslims of Palestine.13 In November 1933, the Muslim League passed a resolution asking the British Government to immediately withdraw the Balfour Declaration as “it opposed the fundamental rights of the people entrusted to their British control”.14 In April 1934 the Council of the Muslim League resolved to send a deputation to wait on the Viceroy to lay before them the facts of how the Balfour Declaration would help the Jews and deprive the Arab inhabitants of their rights. The council also expressed its “whole hearted sympathy and support for the Arabs of Palestine”.15 When the Royal Commission recommended partition of Palestine Quaid-i-Azam strongly condemned it.16 The Muslim League demanded that the recommendations of the Royal Commission be withdrawn and asked the Government of India to instructs its representative as the Assembly of the League of Nations to demand annulment of the mandate and disassociate themselves from any decision tending “to perpetuate it and thus to violate the fundamental rights of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to choose the form of Government best suited to their needs and requirements…17”. On the directive of the Muslim League the Muslims of British India, on 26 August 1938, observed ‘Palestine Day’. In October 1938 the Muslim League sent a four-member delegation to Egypt, to attend an “Arab Leader’s conference” in connection with Palestine. Two of them accompanied an ‘Arab delegation’ to London to discuss the problem with the British Government. The representatives of the Muslim League submitted a statement of the views of the Muslims of British India to the British Government. 18 Quaid-i-Azam made a strong representation to the Viceroy and had a number of interviews with him on the Palestine question.19 In July 1939 the Muslim League opened a ‘Palestine Fund’ for “the relief of the dependents of those, who lost their lives or suffered in the struggle for independence and for the protection of First Qibla of Musalmans”.20 In same year the day of Miraj was observed as ‘Palestine Day’21. On 23 March 1940, when the Muslims of British India met at Lahore and made the historic decision about their future, they expressed their concern on “the inordinate delay on the part of the British Government in coming to a settlement with the Arabs in Palestine”22. In 1945, another ‘Palestine Day’ was observed.23

Besides, Palestine, the Muslim League took up the cause of all the Muslims struggling for their independence and the preservation of their national sovereignty. In 1924, when it was speculated the Iraq would be placed under British mandate the Muslim League declared that Iraq was “a part of Jaziatul Arab and so such should not be left under non-Muslim control of the British as a mandatory power”.24 After the beginning of the Second World War when news were received that war activities might affect the independence of Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Turkey, the Muslim League proclaimed that “in the event of any attack upon Muslim countries, Muslim India will be forced to stand by them and give all the support it can”.25 The Muslim League took up the cause of Iran when Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iranian territories during the war26. On 26 December 1943 the Muslim League passed a resolution demanding the independence of Ceraneca, Libya, Tripoli, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Moracco, Algeria and Tunis27. Quaid-i-Azam condemned the Dutch “imperialist hold” on Indonesia.28

After the creation of Pakistan the moral support given to the Muslim world by the All India League assumed the form of diplomatic support of the Government of Pakistan. The unity of the Muslim states was considered a must for the solution of their problems. Quaid-i-Azam believed that it was only by putting a united front that the Muslim states could “make their voice felt in the councils of the world”29. In order to achieve this objective, in October 1947, he sent Malik Feroz Khan Noon as his special envoy to some of the countries in the Middle East.30 This one-man delegation was the first official mission sent abroad by Pakistan. The aim of the mission was to introduce Pakistan, to explain the reasons of its creation, to familiarise them with its internal and external problems to get their support. Feroz Khan Noon, first visited Ankara, where he met President Ismat Inonu and other Turkish dignatories. He participated in the independence day celebrations of Turkey and gave an exclusive interview to the correspondent of Ulus. From Turkey he went to Syria. At Damascus he held discussions with Syrian leaders. From Damascus he went to Aman and met King Abdullah. On his way to Beirut he met Mufti Amin Al-Husaini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine, who had gone underground and was residing in the suburbs of Beirut. His next and last stop was Riyadh, where he was received by King Abdul Aziz Ibn-e-Saud. The King gave a banquet in Noon’s honour and placed his personal plane at his disposal to take him to Dahran on way to Karachi. Noon returned to Karachi in the first week of December. As there were no diplomatic channels available, Feroz Khan Noon sent his reports to his brother Malik Akbar Hayat Noon, who through Ikramullah delivered them to Quaid-i-Azam. Quaid-i-Azam did not give these reports to the foreign office and kept them with him. Unless these papers are made available nothing can be said with certainly about the extent of the success of the mission; but it is certain that this was the beginning of Pakistan’s close relations with Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which continued to develop in the years to come.

Pakistan lent full diplomatic support to the cause of the Muslims of Palestine. When Pakistan became the member of the United Nations (30 September 1947), the Palestine question was already under active consideration of the United Nations. On the request of the United Kingdom the Secretary General summoned the first special session of the General Assembly. On 15 May 1947 the General Assembly created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The UNSCOP recommended that the Mandate be terminated and Palestine granted independence at the earliest practicable date. The report contained a majority proposal for the ‘Plan of Partition’ with an ‘Economic Union’ and a minority proposal for a ‘Plan for a Federal State of Palestine’31 On 23 September the General Assembly established, the ‘Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine Question’ to consider the report of UNSCOP.

In the Ad Hoc Committee Pakistan opposed the ‘Partition Plan’. Zafarulla claimed that the Balfour Declaration was “invalid”32. He suggested that the Committee should strive “to find a solution which would be in accord with the freely-expressed wishes of the people concerned…33. He declared that Pakistan was utterly and uncompromisingly opposed to the partition of Palestine”34 He warned the Committee that the partition of Palestine “might provoke a conflict which the United Nations would find difficult to contain”35.

On 23 September 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee established two sub-committees. ‘Sub-Committee I’ was entrusted with drawing up a detailed plan based on the majority proposals of UNSCOP; and ‘Sub Committee 2’ to draw up a detailed plan in accordance with the proposals of Saudi Arabia and Iraq for the reorganisation of Palestine as an independent Unitary State36. Pakisan was a member of Sub-Committee 2’. On 28 October 1947, on the resignation of the representative of Columbia, Zafarullah was elected its Chairman. In its report ‘Sub-Committee I’ recommended “the adoption and implementation” of the ‘Plan of Partition’ with an ‘Economic Union’37. Sub-Committee 2 raised legal, constitutional and political objections and asked the General Assembly to refer them to the International Court of Justice. The Committee stressed that the United Nations had “no authority under the Charter to partition Palestine or any way to impair its integrity against the wishes of the majority of the people”38.

The Committee proposed a “unitary and sovereign” state for Palestine.39 Commenting on the ‘Partition Plan’ proposed by the Sub Committee I’ Zafarulla said that Pakistan could not accept it because “it had no legal basis and was unworkable…and instead of settling the dispute, served to add to the exciting difficulties.”40

The Ad Hoc Committee did not accept the proposals of ‘Sub-Committee 2’ and include in its repot the draft resolution of ‘Sub-Commttee I’ embodying the ‘Plan of Partition’ with an ‘Economic Union’, with various amendments.

Pakistan made an eleventh hour attempt to convince the United States, which was the main supporter of the ‘Partition Plan’ and was exerting pressure on small states, to vote for it, that the decision to partition Palestine was “ultra vires of the United Nations Charter” and was “basically wrong and invalid in law”. Quaid-i-Azam sent a cable to President Truman and appealed to him, and through him to the people of the United Sates to uphold the right of the Arabs. He wrote: “The Government and the people of the America can yet save this dangerous situation by giving a correct lead and thus avoid the greatest consequences and repercussions”41. The United States, which was more concerned with her interests in the Middle East than the moral and legal rights of the Arabs, managed to get two third votes in favour of the ‘Partition Plan’. Pakistan was one of the thirteen members which cast negative votes. Commenting on the role played by the United States Zafarulla said that “The Partition Plan could be called a United States’ rather then a United Nation’ decision.42 Pakistan did not take part in the election of the United Nations Commissions which was set up to implement the decision of the General Assembly. When Israel was admitted to the United Nations Pakistan opposed and voted against it; and refused to recognise the state of Israel.

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (which also functioned as its parliament) adopted a motion expressing deep sympathy with the people of Palestine in their “struggle in the cause of justice and peace in Palestine”43. Later, when foreign policy of Pakistan took a shape, support to the cause of the Muslims in general and that of Palestine in particular became its cardinal principle.

By 1949, Pakistan, to a great extent, overcame its major internal problems and for the first time gave a serious consideration to the formulation of a definite and determined foreign policy. During the formative phase Pakistan explored different alternatives. Liaquat Ali Khan’s acceptance of the Russian invitation to visit Moscow, Pakistan’s attempts to institutionalise its relations with the Muslim World, and Liaquat’s visit to the U.S.A and Canada were earliest attempt in this direction.

References

  1. G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-66, London, 1968, PP. 41-42.
  2. John Connel, Auchinleck, London, 1956, pp. 920-22.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Vincent Shean in New York Herald Tribune, 16 June 1948, quoted by S.M. Burke, Mainprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, Karachi, 1957, p. 58.
  5. Ian Stephens, Horned Moon, London, 1953, p. 215.
  6. Connel, op. cit., PP. 220-22.
  7. Choudhury, op. cit., P. 63.
  8. Ibid., P. 50.
  9. The information about the condition of the foreign office is based on author’s interviews with the officials who were in the foreign office at that time.
  10. Burke, op. cit., P. 77.
  11. Jamiluddin Ahmed, ed., Speeches and Statements of Mr. Jinnah Vol. I, Lahore, 1960, P. 421.
  12. Ibid., P. 36.
  13. For the Texts of these Resolutions see; Resolutions of the All India Muslim League, May 1924 to December 1943, in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakisan: All India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947, Vol. II, Karachi, 1970.
  14. Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936, Delhi?, n.d., p. 59.
  15. Quoted by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ‘Quaid-i-Azam and Islamic Solidarity’, Zahid Malik, ed., Re-Emerging Muslim World, Lahore, 1974, PP. 28-29.
  16. See. Ahmed op. cit., PP. 34-36.
  17. Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from October 1937 to December 1938, Delhi? 1944, Delhi? 1944, PP. 1-2. PP. 1-2.
  18. For details of the activities of the delegation see Chaudhuri Khaliquzzaman, Only if they know it? Karachi, 1965, PP. 15-18.
  19. Malik op. cit., p. 30.
  20. Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940, Delhi? N.d., p. 12.
  21. Ibid., P. 22.
  22. Ibid., P. 49.
  23. Malik, op. cit., P. 31.
  24. Resolutions of the All India Muslim league from May 1924 to December 1936, Delhi,? n.d., p. 21.
  25. Resolution of the All India Muslim League from March 1940 to April 1941, Delhi? n.d. p. 20.
  26. Resolution of the All India Muslim League from March 1941 to April 1942, Delhi?, n.d., P. 5.
  27. Resolution of the All India Muslim League from May 1943 to December 1943, Delhi,? n.d., PP. 29-30.
  28. Jamiluddin Ahmed, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah Vol. II, Lahore, 1964, PP. 301-2.
  29. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General 1947-48, Karachi, n.d., P. 26.
  30. The information about the visit is based on author’s interview with Mr. Farooq, who accompanied Malik Feroz Khan as his Private Secretary.
  31. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly Vol. I, New York, 1947, P. 42.
  32. U.N. Document No. A/AC-14/SR-7, 7 October 1947, P. 2.
  33. Ibid., P. 8.
  34. U.N. Document No. A/AC-14/SR-12, 13 October 1947, p. 6.
  35. U.N. Document No. A/AC-14/SR-30, 24 October 1947, P. 7.
  36. Year Book of the United Nations 1947-48, New York, 1949, pp. 237-38.
  37. Official Record of the Second Session of the General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, New York
  38. Ibid., P. 290.
  39. Ibid., P. 302.
  40. U.N. Document No. A/AC-14/SR-31, 24 November 1947, P. 4.
  41. Malik, op. cit., P. 32.
  42. Official record of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Vol. II, New York, 1948, p. 51.
  43. Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Debates Vol. I, Karachi, P. 891.

 

Source:  World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
                Edited by: Ahmad Hasan Dani, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 1979.

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