Quaid-e-Azam's Perception of Pakistan's Relations with India

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a peace loving person and wanted Pakistan to be a peace loving state with neutral and independent foreign policy. He wanted Pakistan to enter the arena of world politics with the pious hope of ‘peace within and peace without1. Even in his broadcast speech from All-India Radio on June 3, 1947, he appealed to all the communities of India particularly Muslims ‘to maintain peace and order2’ He had every respect for the United Nations and wanted the organization to work for the betterment of the mankind. He assured complete ‘material and moral support’ of Pakistan for ‘the oppressed and suppressed people of the world’. He made it clear that Pakistan, being a believer of ‘the principles of honesty and fairplay in national and international dealings’, would not support any ‘aggressive designs against any country or nation’3.

Quaid-i-Azam also intended to keep ‘friendly and cordial relations with the neighbouring countries4. He stated that Pakistan had ‘no aggressive design’ against its neighbours. About Indo-Pakistan relations he was of the view that the two nations should forget their past tensions and start a new era of peace and friendship. He wanted the two countries to be ‘of use to each other’5. He thought that the two countries will be needing a number of things from each other and can help each other ‘morally, materially and politically’ and thus could ‘raise the prestige and status of both Dominions’6. While congratulating Mr. C. Rajagopalachari on his appointment as Governor General of India the Quaid expressed a desire and expectation for ‘real friendship between the two Dominions’7.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah believed that once Pakistan achieves its goal of peace within and peace without, the two nations would be able to live in peace and harmony8. However, he wanted India to ‘shed the superiority complex’ and treat Pakistan on ‘equal footing’ and also to ‘fully appreciate the realities’9. At the time of departure from Delhi to Karachi on August 7, 1947. Quaid-i-Azam, in a statement, expressed his thanks to the people and leaders of India who expressed good wishes for the newly established dominion of Pakistan. At the same occasion he requested the people of Delhi to bury the past and to ‘start afresh as two independent sovereign States of Hindustan and Pakistan’. He also wished Hindustan ‘prosperity and peace’10. In his reply to Lord Mountbatten’s speech during the transfer of power ceremonies he sent a message of cheer and goodwill for India and also affirmed his faith in good neighbourly relations with her.11

The Quaid was interested in building a better future for the people of India and Pakistan. He wanted the people of the two countries to develop cordial relations based on the concept of mutual respect and co-existence.12 He considered it beneficial for both Pakistan and India if the two countries would cooperate with each other ‘for the purpose of playing their part in international affairs’. He went to the extent that Pakistan and India should enter in defence collaboration ‘both on land and sea against any aggression’. But he made it clear that it will only be possible if the two countries can ‘resolve their own differences’13. Quaid-i-Azam had, in fact, pleaded for a common defence policy between India and Pakistan as early as in April 194714.

Quaid-i-Azam assured that the government of Pakistan will take care of the ‘life and properties of the minorities’ living in Pakistan and ‘shall give them a fair deal15’. He advised the Muslims of India ‘to give unflinching loyalty to the state’ where they live. But in response to all these efforts on the part of the Muslims he hoped that the Indian Government would not act on the advice of ‘those who are bent upon the eviction or extermination of Muslims of India by brutal and inhuman methods’16.

The Quaid clearly visualized that the subcontinent being an organic unit called for a common defence strategy and also that if the two could effectively cooperate economically both would benefit. Pakistan as the meeting point of India and the Muslim Middle East could play an important role between the two regions17. The Quaid was also aware of the fact that the alliance between India and Soviet Union would have a direct impact on Pakistani economy18.

As late as the last week of April 1948, Quaid-i-Azam talked about good trade relations between India and Pakistan. However, he thought that it was only possible if the two countries enter into ‘normal international relations’. Subject to this condition he could envisage that India and Pakistan should reciprocate in providing ‘bonding facilities’ to each other at their respective ports, Calcutta and Karachi19.

Knowing the long history of difference between the two nations in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, there was a question in every mind as to whether the two countries will be able to enjoy good relations. They remembered with regency effect that only few months back Congress had sabotaged the Cabinet Mission Plan when after their premature jubilation, they came to provinces20. Despite the fact that Quaid-i-Azam had seen the Hindus very closely during the last fifty years, he was still hoping against hope that the partition providing independence and autonomy to both will change the attitudes which had prevailed for about a century since the establishment of the British Raj. He was almost certain that minorities in both the countries will enjoy every right in their respective countries and will be ‘made to feel that their life, property and honour are absolutely safe and secure’21. The Quaid, in the face of his sincerity and optimism, did not realize that the acceptance of partition by the Hindus was not a change of heart on their part but only a change of tactics.

Like most small countries, the foreign policy of Pakistan begins and ends at her borders, particularly at the Indian border. It has been dominated by the fear of Indian aggression. For Pakistan the problems began at the outset of its existence. The Quaid, with his rational mind, thought that the demands of both the Congress and the League had been met partially, though not fully, and the two states had emerged through an agreement, secured however reluctantly. So he reasoned that it was time for burying the hatchet and setting up the good neighbourly relations22. However, Indian attitude remained unchanged.

According to the Indian writers most of their leaders believed that India and Pakistan would be able to come closer and establish harmonious relations with each other. They hold that the biggest hurdle in the good relationship between the two countries was the ‘self imposed’ fear of Indian aggression in the minds of Pakistani leadership23. But a good look into the history of the period makes it clear that this fear was not ‘imaginary’. Hindu leaders of the Indian National Congress were on a different wave length. A large number of them considered the creation of a Muslim State in South Asia as a hurdle in achieving their dream of ‘Akhand Bharat’. On April 5, 1946, Nehru declared that ‘nothing on earth’ can bring ‘about Pakistan which Jinnah wants’24. Gandhi approximately a year later in March 1947 claimed that the Congress would only accept Pakistan ‘over my dead body’25.

The intentions of the Congress leadership became quite clear when they accepted the June 3 Plan with serious mental reservations. Hindus started propagating that Pakistan will not sustain for long and will breakdown sooner or later and at last will become a part of ‘Mother India’. Gandhi, commenting on the plan, declared Hindus and Muslims ‘interdependent on one another’ and predicted that Muslim League leadership ‘will ask to come back to Hindustan’ and Nehru ‘will take them back’26. In this broadcast of June 3, 1947, Nehru expressed his hope that probably in this way Hindus ‘shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise’.27 Nehru and Patel accepted the partition with the assumption that by conceding Pakistan to Jinnah they will get rid of him and thus, in the words of Nehru, ‘by cutting off the head we shall get rid of headache’28. The same viewpoint was promoted in most of the memoirs, diaries and books published by the Congress minded people in the last phase of the British Raj.

Hindu leaders kept expressing the same views even after the creation of Pakistan. Off and on, it was suggested that sooner or later sanity would return to the lesser of the two parallel streams and that they would converge to a point to make the roaring river of one united India29. However, Nehru and Krishna Menon had stated that Congress had accepted the partition only to get rid of the British30 30. On the event of the first independence day of India, Sardar Patel was sure that Pakistan would crash in a short period of time31 . J.B. Kripalani, the Congress President, remarked that the freedom they had achieved was not ‘complete without the unity of India’32 . A well known Indian newspaper Amrita Bazar Patrika reported that Gandhi had decided to retire from the active politics on August 15, 1947 and would do something for the Muslims of Pakistan so that he could ‘bring them into the union of India and to restore Indian unity’33.

The Pakistani leadership did not take these threats seriously. They believed that by such idle talks, the Congress leaders tried to hide their defeat at the hands of Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League. But it is a fact that had Congress leaders not been confident of the eventual collapse of Pakistan, they would have never ever agreed to its creation34. The Congress leaders believed that Pakistan was bound to collapse and thus tried to hasten the procedure.

Quaid-i-Azam did show his disappointment over the propaganda against the creation of Pakistan35. He said that the threats against the sovereignty of Pakistan, from the Congress leadership, will not ‘restore goodwill and friendly relations between the two states’. He also made it clear that Pakistan will ‘never surrender’ and will never accept any ‘constitutional reunion’ between the two dominions with ‘one common centre’. He was also sure that Pakistan was established to stay and ‘will stay’36.

It was not only limited to the expressed wishes of the Indian leaders but they infact did every thing they could to damage the independence of Pakistan. The Indians had a needling sense of frustration at having lost what they considered a natural part of mother India37. In a letter to the British Prime Minister, dated September 28, 1947, Field Martial Achinleck felt no hesitation in expressing his opinion that the Indian Cabinet was ‘determined to do all in their power’ to prohibit the ‘establishment of the dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis’. He also made it clear that Indian leaders, Cabinet Ministers, civil officials and others were also trying to ‘obstruct the work of partition of the Armed Forces’. He further expressed that the Indian Government was trying its best to ‘prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or indeed anything of arsenals and depots in India’38.

India took a series of measures to practically destroy the independence of the dominion of Pakistan. First step they took in this regard was their influence on the Radcliffe Award which was to demarcate the boundaries between the two countries. The Chairman of the Boundary Commission was openly accused of going beyond his terms of reference and the Award was universally condemned as territorial murder39.

Quaid-i-Azam declared the Radcliffe Award as ‘unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse’. He considered the Boundary Award as the ‘latest blow’ to the problems of Pakistan. He termed them as ‘political award’ and not judicial. Still he said that as ‘we have agreed to abide by it’ as ‘honourable people we must abide by it’40. Though Pakistan and particularly Punjab suffered a lot from these awards. Yet, it wad due to the hold of the Quaid over his people that they accepted the awards without reservation and did not agitate against it41.

It was expected that the partition of the sub continent will solve the major problems of the two communities living in the region and that both the countries will accommodate their respective minorities as an integral part of their nation. But the Hindus, who were not prepared to see an independent Muslim state in South Asia, started large scale anti-Muslim riots with the help of the government. The Hindus started killing Muslims and setting their houses and property on fire. The massacre of Muslims took place throughout India but the condition of East Punjab, the city of Delhi and Ajmair was the worst42. The modern history had never witnessed such a large scale communal murder. It was nothing less than a war against the Muslim minority of East Punjab and in a number of adjoining princely states43.

Due to the communal riots in India at the time of partition, a large scale migration took place in which millions of Muslims were forced to leave their homes in India. During these riots thousands of Muslims lost their lives while millions were forced to migrate to Pakistan. Within a period of six or seven weeks between August 1, and September 20, 1947, nearly half a million Muslims were killed44. Lord Ismay, the Viceroy’s chief of staff, told the Quaid that ‘Delhi itself was on the verge of chaos, Muslims were systematically hunted down and butchered’. Quaid-i-Azam was shocked when he asked, ‘How could any civilized government permit such a state of affairs?45.

The Quaid, in his message to the nation on the occasion of Eid, said that the joy of the day was ‘overshadowed by the suffering and sorrow of 5 million Muslims in East Punjab and its neighbourhood’46. He condemned the Hindu attitude of compelling the Muslims of India to ‘declare their folly’ for supporting Pakistan and believing in the ‘fantastic two nation theory47. He believed that a certain section in India was determined to ‘drive Muslims from the entire Dominion by making life impossible for them’48. He appealed to all the Muslims of the world for ‘brotherly sympathy, support and cooperation’ for the Muslims of India49. Quaid-i-Azam also approached the Commonwealth countries for help in ending the murderous raids on the trains and columns of refugees50.

Quaid-i-Azam was very much concerned about the Muslims in India. He was personally following the latest developments and was well aware of the fact that many of them were living ‘as worse than prisoners’. He tried to do his best to have a ‘constant communication’ with the Indian Government’ on the subject’. He hoped and wished that the authorities in India will do ‘every thing possible’ for the ‘safety and the welfare of the Muslims’ and Indian government will deal with the people responsible for all those happenings ‘with the iron hand’51. The Quaid called upon the Indian Government not to penalize the Muslims of India ‘for their help and sympathy for the establishment of Pakistan’ 52. He said if the ‘ultimate solution of the minority problem’ was ‘mass exchange of population’ then it should be done according to the ‘Government plan’ and should not be left to ‘be sorted out by bloodthirsty elements’53.

Instead of what was happening in East Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam urged the Muslims of West Punjab to secure the protection of minorities as a sacred undertaking in accordance with the teachings of Islam54. He considered it a matter of prestige and honour to ‘safeguard the lives’ of the minority communities and to create a ‘sense of security among them’55. He said that Pakistan was to ‘maintain peace, law and order’ and would safeguard every citizen of Pakistan regardless of ‘caste, creed or community’56. In his broadcast speech from Radio Pakistan, Dacca on March 28, 1948 he congratulated the people of the province for their good treatment with the Hindu minorities57.

In conspiracy with and under the active guidance of Mountbatten, the Indian government launched upon a military grab of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which should have constituted an integral part of Pakistan58. Indian occupation of Kashmir was not only an emotional setback but was also a threat to Pakistan’s defence, communication and economy59. Pakistanis considered Kashmir as the life line of Pakistan. According to G.W. Choudhry, ‘To a Pakistani, Kashmir is not a remote and unknown country; it is near and dear and vital: near in geography; dear in religion; vital in strategy’60.

When Maharaja through a deal announced the accession of the State to India on the 27th of October 1947, Quaid-i-Azam on the very next day ordered the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, Lt. Gen. Sir D. Gracy to invade Kashmir61. Commander-in-Chief referred the matter to Field Marshal Auchinleck. Auchinleck asked Quaid-i-Azam to take his orders back otherwise all the British officers from both the armies would resign62, which Pakistan could not afford at that time.

Moreover, Quaid-i-Azam planned a conference between Governor-Generals and Prime Ministers of the two Dominions which could not take place due to the illness of Nehru and reluctance of Patel to talk with Pakistani Leaders63. However a meeting was held between the two Governor-Generals: Quaid-i-Azam and Mountbatten, at Lahore on November 1, 1947. In this meeting the former called for a cease-fire in Kashmir with forty eight hours as well as the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Indian troops from the state. He also proposed that the two Governor-Generals should be vested with full powers by the government of Pakistan and India to restore peace, undertake the administration of the state and arrange a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision64. Mountbatten gave no reply at that time. However, he turned down all the proposals after consulting Indian cabinet65.

On the contrary Indian Defence Minister announced in the Indian parliament that Indian army would launch a major offensive in Kashmir. Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, Sir Gracy made it clear that Indian army will not be allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naoshera66. It was in early May 1948 that Pakistan government, with the recommendations of Quaid-i-Azam and the Commander-in-Chief, sent a limited number of troops to Kashmir to hold certain defensive positions and prevent the Indian army from advancing to the borders of Pakistan67.

Pakistan’s representative in the Security Council made it clear that the Pakistan government has not accepted and cannot accept the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India. In their view the accession was based on violence and fraud68. Quaid-i-Azam was himself monitoring the activities in the Security Council and was interested in getting the information about the latest developments on regular basis69.

There were a few other irritants which created bad blood between the two countries. These related to distribution of financial assets, working of the Reserve Bank of India, distribution of military stores and adjustment of trade relations70. The economy of Pakistan which was already in flex was further damaged by the Indian refusal to pay her due share. Pakistan which was to get Rs. 75 crore, was given only Rs 20 crore and the Indian Government said that the rest of the Rs. 55 crore will be given after the satisfactory solution of the Kashmir affair71. Indian Government made the undeclared war between India and Pakistan as an excuse for withholding the supplies of arms to Pakistan72.

As an upper riparian power, it was India’s international obligation to ensure that Pakistan received its legitimate share of the waters. But India threatened unilateral stoppage of supplies to Pakistan and maintained that it has exclusive rights over the water of the rivers. It was a claim that could not be sustained either on the basis of prior appropriation or equitable distribution73. As the majority of the trade of the areas included in Pakistan was dependent on the areas included in India, a Standstill Agreement was signed between the two countries providing no restriction on the free flow of goods between the two dominions and no trade or custom barrier would be set up74.

By doing all these activities, the Indian leaders predicted that Pakistan would be left bankrupt and what they failed to achieve through fire and sword, would be brought about by ruining the finances of the State. They were sure that Pakistan will not be able to counter the economic invasion because the liquid financial resources of the country had touched its lowest level75. Quaid-i-Azam felt that imposition of customs on the borders would ‘involve the Hindu business community’ of Pakistan ‘in serious economic difficulties’ and thus many Hindu businessmen would remove ‘their business to the Indian Dominion’. The Quaid promised, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, all possible steps ‘for the protection of their well being’ and asked them not to leave their ‘ancestral homes in East Bengal for an unknown fate in the Indian Union’76.

Talking about the difficulties like ‘withholding by India of our cash balances, of our share of military equipment and lately, the institution of an almost complete economic blockade’ the Quaid was sure that ‘all right-thinking men’ in India ‘deplore these happenings’ and predicted that the ‘mind that has been responsible for them’ will be changed77. He said that the external elements were also ‘encouraging provincialism in the hope of weakening Pakistan’ and trying for re-absorption of East Pakistan ‘into the Indian dominion’. He made it clear that those who were involved in those activities were ‘living in a fool’s paradise’78.

Quaid-i-Azam believed in honesty, justice and fairplay in every sphere of life. He practiced these principles and expected the others to follow. No wonder that inspite of India’s repeated attempts to harm Pakistan the Quaid remained optimistic. In his letter to M.A.H. Isphahani in June 1948, Quaid-i-Aam hoped that Pakistan will be able to solve all its problems because her cause was righteous and she was facing them ‘with honesty’ and was fighting for ‘justice and fairplay’.79.

The long series of grave and disturbing developments preceding and immediately following the emergence of Pakistan, were certain to cast their ominous shadow on the future relations between the two countries80. Had India formally accepted Pakistan as a living reality from the core of its heart the tensions between the Muslims and the Hindus of South Asia would have been buried in 1947. It is what was desired by the Quaid, who was keenly interested in strengthening human relations between the people of both countries81. Had the Quaid’s dream of co-cooperative Pak-India relations been materialized, the region would never have been a scene of conflicts.

Notes and References
  1. Speech at the inauguration of the Pakistan Broadcasting Service, Karachi: August 15, 1947 in Rafique Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Lahore Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), p. 429.
  2. Broadcast Speech from All India Radio, New Delhi: June 3, 1947 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan (Islamabad: Services Book Club, 1989) p. 13.
  3. Broadcast talk to the People of the United States of America: February 1948 in ibid., p. 158.
  4. Speech at the inauguration of the Pakistan Broadcasting service, Karachi: August 15, 1947 in Rafique Afzal, ed. Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 429.
  5. Press Conference at New Delhi: July 14, 1947 in ibid., p. 423.
  6. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter: October 25, 1947, in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 82.
  7. Message to Mr. C. Rajagopalachari on his appointment as the Governor General of the Indian Dominion: May 5, 1948 in Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 464.
  8. Z.A. Suleri, My Leader (Lahore: Publishers Progressive Papers Ltd., 1982), p. 290.
  9. Interview to De Eric Streiff, Correspondent of Neue Zurcher Zeitung: March 11, 1948 in Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 459.
  10. Statement on the Eve of his departure for Karachi: August 7, 1947 in ibid., p.428.
  11. Sharif a Mujahid, ‘India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis’, in Latif Ahmed Sherwani, et.al, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Analysis (Karachi: The Allies Book Corporation, 1954) p. 32.
  12. Riaz Ahmad, Quaid-i-Azam’s Perception of Islam and Pakistan (Rawalpindi: Alvi Publishers, 1990), p.115.
  13. Interview to De Eric Streiff, Correspondent of Neue Zurcher Zeitung: March 11, 1948 in Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 459.
  14. Deccan Times, August 10, 1947, quoted in Sharif al Mujahid, ‘India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis’, p. 32.
  15. Address to Civil, Naval, Military & Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi: October 11, 1947 in Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976), p. 420.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Suleri, My Leader, p. 291.
  18. Ibid., p. 292.
  19. Speech in reply to the Address presented by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce: April 27, 1948 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 252.
  20. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 32.
  21. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter: October 25, 1947, in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements AS Governor General of Pakistan, p. 82.
  22. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 31.
  23. Kalim Bahadur, ‘India and Pakistan’, in Verinder Gover, ed., International Relations and the Foreign Policy of India Vol. II (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1992), p. 684.
  24. E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, p. 78 quoted S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 57.
  25. Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 218.
  26. New York Herald Tribune (New York, June 5, 1947).
  27. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide (London: Hutchinson, 1969) p. 315.
  28. Allan Campbell-Jonson, Mission with Mountbatten, p. 98, quoted S.K. Majumdar, Jinnah and Gandhi (Lahore: People’s Publishing House, 1976), p. 259.
  29. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 33.
  30. Statesman, October 14, 1947 quoted in S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 9.
  31. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.242.
  32. ‘Troubled India and Her Neighbors’, Foreign Affairs (New York, January, 1965), p. 319.
  33. New York Times, August 8, 1947, quoted Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy, p. 58.
  34. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 33.
  35. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter October 25, 1947, in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 82.
  36. Ibid., p. 83.
  37. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy, p. 56.
  38. Aziz Beg, Pakistan Faces India (Lahore: Babur and Amer Publications, n.d.), p. 56.
  39. Ibid., p. 52.
  40. Broadcast Speech from Radio Pakistan, Lahore: October 30, 1947 as in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 97.
  41. G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 56.
  42. Hameed A.K. Rai, ‘India’s Policy Towards Pakistan’, in Hameed A.K. Rai, ed., Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Vol. I (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, n.d.), p. 314.
  43. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, p. 41.
  44. Ibid., p. 42.
  45. Lord Ismay, Memories, p. 436 quoted in ibid., p. 43.
  46. Message to the Nation on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha: October 24, 1947 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 80.
  47. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter: October 25, 1947, in ibid., p. 83.
  48. Address to Civil, Naval, Military & Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi: October 11, 1947 in ibid., p. 77.
  49. Message to the Nation on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha: October 24, 1947 in ibid., p. 80.
  50. Burke and Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 48.
  51. Statement issued on September 15, 1947 in Afzal, ed. Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, pp. 436-37.
  52. Riaz, Quaid-i-Azam’s Perception of Islam and Pakistan, p. 118.
  53. Address to Civil, Naval, Military & Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi: October 11, 1947 in Jamil, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II, p. 420.
  54. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, p. 44.
  55. Speech at a Rally at the University Stadium, Lahore: October 30, 1947 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 95.
  56. Speech at a public meeting at Dacca: March 21, 1948 in ibid., p. 180.
  57. Broadcast speech from Radio Pakistan, Dacca: March 28, 1948 in ibid., p. 210.
  58. Suleri, My Leader, p. 291.
  59. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, p. 90.
  60. ibid., p. 91.
  61. ibid., p. 103.
  62. Alastair Lamb, Birth of Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 99.
  63. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 159.
  64. Sibtain Tahira, Kashmir and the United Nations (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1990), p. 28.
  65. Alafuddin Turabi, Tehrik-i-Azadi-i-Kashmir Manzil Ba Manzil (Lahore: Al Badr Publications. 1992), p. 77.
  66. Major Iqbal Hashmi, The Bleeding Kashmir (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1993), p. 73.
  67. Turabi, Tehrik-i-Azadi-i-Kashmir Manzil Ba Manzil, p. 105.
  68. Hashmi, The Bleeding Kashmir, p. 70.
  69. M.A.H. Ispahani, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1976), p. 268.
  70. S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pak Realtions: Tashkent to Simla Agreement (new Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1981), p. 20.
  71. Beg, Pakistan Faces India, p. 58.
  72. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations Tashkent to Simla Agreement, p. 21.
  73. Mushtaq Ahmad, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1968), p. 20.
  74. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent, to Simla Agreement, p. 21.
  75. Beg, Pakistan Faces India, p. 57.
  76. Broadcst speech from Radio Pakistan, Decca: March 28, 1948 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, pp. 210-11.
  77. Speech at the Dacca University Convocation: March 24, 1948 in ibid., p. 193.
  78. Ibid.
  79. Quaid-i-Azam’s letter to Mr. Hasan Ispahani from Quetta June 14, 1948 in Ispahani, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: As I Knew Him, p. 272.
  80. Mushtaq, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 15.
  81. Riaz, Quaid-i-Azam’s Perception of Islam and Pakistan, p. 121.
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