Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts

Our National Purpose

"What we must look for is, first, religious and moral principles; secondly gentlemanly conduct; thirdly intellectual ability.” Thomas Arnold

The national resilience of the Pakistani people is to be judged by the degree of their consciousness and commitment to guard their values, traditions and honour called the ‘national purpose’, or the raison d’être, as the French call it. National purpose is sacrosanct and sublime. Quaid-i-Azam first of all preferred to affirm his own faith, belief and commitment to the cause of Pakistan.

On October 22, 1939, while addressing All-India Muslim Council, he said:
“I have seen enough in my life, experienced the pleasures of wealth, fame and life of repose and comfort. Now I have one single ambition, to see Muslims gaining freedom and rise to the pinnacle of glory. It is my very ultimate wish that when I die, my conscience and my Allah may testify that, Jinnah never betrayed Islam and that he relentlessly struggled for the freedom of Muslims, to forge institutional discipline among them and strengthen their resolve. I do not wish to get acclamation or reward from you. I only nourish the desire that, my heart, my faith and my conscience, all bear testimony till my death that Jinnah, ‘you contributed your share for the resistance against Islam and my Allah proclaim that “Jinnah you were a born Muslim, lived as such and died, quite steadfastly, holding the banner of Islam against the evil forces.”

Why The Quaid-e-Azam Left Congress

In 1913 the Quaid-i-Azam joined the All India Muslim League without abandoning the membership of the Congress of which he had been an active member for some years. But this membership of the two organizations ended in December 1920. On the occasion of the special session at Nagpur the Congress adopted a new creed which permitted the use of unconstitutional means and decided to resort to non-violent non-co-operation for the attainment of self-government. The new policy and programme in essence envisaged withdrawal of the students from schools and colleges, boycott of law-courts by lawyers and litigants as well as the impending elections to the legislatures under the Government of India act 1919 either as voters or as candidates.1 The new philosophy of the Congress had been shaped almost entirely under the influence of Gandhi who had, by then, emerged as a commanding figure in Congress politics. Although there were many prominent Congressmen such as C.R. Das and Lala Lajpat Rai who did not subscribe to the programme of non-co-operation2, Jinnah was the only one in a crowd of several thousand people who openly expressed serious disagreement.

Leaving an indelible mark on history

Mohammad Ali Jinnah deserves credit for carving out a homeland for his countrymen. A tribute to the founding father.

One of the most revered historical figures in Pakistan is its founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Known to his people as Quaid-i-Azam or 'the great leader,' Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a man of indomitable will and dauntless courage. He was considered the unifying force that brought Indian Muslims under the banner of the Muslim League, later carving out a homeland for them despite stiff opposition from the Hindu Congress and the then British government.

Born on December 25, 1876, in Karachi to a wealthy merchant, Mohammad Ali Jinnah received his early education at the Sindh Madrasa and later in Karachi at the Mission School. He travelled to England for further studies in 1892 at the age of 16. In 1896 Jinnah qualified for the bar, which he was called to in 1897. Jinnah began his political career in 1906 when he attended the Calcutta session of the All India National Congress in the capacity of private secretary to the president of the Congress.

Time magazine said of him: "His greatest delight was to confound the opposing lawyer by confidential asides and to outwit the presiding judge in repartee."

By 1940 the Muslim League adopted the 'Lahore Resolution' calling for separate autonomous states in majority-Muslim areas of northeastern and eastern India. In 1946 violence between Hindus and Muslims broke out after Jinnah called for demonstrations opposing an interim Indian government in which Muslim power would be compromised. Against the rising tide of ethnic unrest, Jinnah demanded the partition of India. Britain, eager to make a clean break with India, finally relented and Pakistan was born.

Pakistan : As Envisaged by Allama Iqbal and Quaid-e-Azam M.A. Jinnah

A strange phenomenon indeed that even after a lapse of 62 years of Pakistan having come into existence, a controversy is still raging as to which type of system was intended to be implemented here Secular, Theocratic or any other. A group of so- called intellectuals opine that the architect of Pakistan, Quaid-i- Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, wanted it to emerge as a Secular State. They base their arguments exclusively on Quaid’s address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11,1947 .On the other hand, there is the religious orthodoxy, that had initially opposed the very creation of Pakistan under the pretext that since they had been promised by the Indian National Congress, that the Muslims would be free to discharge their religious obligations freely in India after independence, there was no need to create a separate state for the Indian Muslims. However, no sooner did Pakistan come into existence, these so- called “ Ulema” flocked to the new born state and had the temerity to claim that since Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, they only were the competent authority to determine the Islamic system to be implemented here .Now, who does not know, that their’s is essentially a retrogressive and purely ritualistic brand of “ Islam”, which they intend to impose, here forcibly.

Best way to resolve this riddle is to learn the truth from the proverbial “horse’s mouth” Who can be the better judge to resole the dilemma than the founders of Pakistan, namely, Allama Iqbal, who conceived the idea of a separate state for the Indian Muslims and Quaid-i-Azam M.A. Jinnah , who realized Iqbal’s dream by securing a country for them— the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, . Given here under, are excerpts from the speeches and addresses of these giants, to make the issue crystal clear.

Iqbal, the spiritual father of Pakistan, who conceived the idea of a separate state for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, said during his presidential address at the annual session of the All India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930, that” India was the biggest Islamic country and in it Islam could be sustained as a living cultural entity only if it was centralized in a specific territory.( for that, he demanded ) formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interest of India and Islam. For India, it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabic Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its laws, its education, its customs, its culture, and to bring them in close contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times”.

Mr Jinnah Vs Gandhi

Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a straight forward person and used to say harsh and to the point things to Gandhi.

Followers of Gandhi once asked him, "Mr Jinnah is very outspoken and tell you whatever he likes, why don't you reply him in the same manners""

Gandhi replied " I hear from one ear and take out from another ear"

Followers of Mr Jinnah informed him about Gandhi's remarks

Mr Jinnah replied " This is only possible when in between the both ears nothing exists"

Thank you Mr Jinnah

By Dr Syed Mansoor Hussain

Unfortunately for the Palestinians, they had nobody like Jinnah leading them — someone who had the foresight and the courage to accept the partition of Palestine. Instead of accepting partition, the Palestinians and the Arabs attacked the newly formed Jewish state

Whenever a few Pakistanis or Pakistani expat ‘liberal’ types get together, after a couple of libations to lubricate ideas and speech, often the conversation comes to the question whether we in Pakistan would have been better off if there were no partition of India.

Now I am not a serious student of the history of partition and am aware only of the basic facts. These being that the Muslim League won most of the Muslim seats during the elections held in 1946 and as such also won the right to represent the Muslims of India. Jinnah, as the leader of the Muslims, decided to opt for Pakistan when the All India Congress led by Nehru and Patel rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan. And this Pakistan that came into being was not quite what Jinnah had expected.

Some historians have said that Jinnah referred to the country he got as a “moth-eaten” Pakistan. Whether that is true is not material since Jinnah accepted whatever he got and it laid the foundation of one and then two Muslim majority countries in the Indian subcontinent, something envisaged by the Lahore Resolution of 1940. It is also an undeniable fact that we in Pakistan could indeed have done a lot better for ourselves.

Photo Albums

Album # 1:
Young Mr. Jinnah

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Album # 2:
Quaid-e-Azam Residency – Ziarat
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Album # 3:
Jinnah’s Family

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Album # 4:
Jinnah House in London

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Album # 5:

Mazar-e-Quaid - مزار قائد

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Album # 6:

Quaid-e-Azam & Pakistan Movement


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Album # 7:

Rare Photos of Quaid-e-Azam - I

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Album # 8:
Rare Photos of Quaid-e-Azam - II

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Album # 9:
Quaid-e-Azam (All Photos)

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Album # 10:

Quaid-e-Azam's firearms license

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Quaid-e-Azam and Pakistan's Foreign Policy

This paper suggests that Pakistan’s foreign policy under Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah represented a confluence of three variables: the Quaid’s world view or cosmology, the security compulsions of the new State of Pakistan and the cold war international system in which Pakistan had to conduct itself after its inception on 14 August 1947. Despite his failing health, the Quaid could find time to define the strategic parameters of Pakistan’s foreign policy according to his own predilections. Pakistan “did not have a full time Foreign Minister until December 1947” and “in practice all papers were put up to Quaid-i-Azam for information or decision.”1

The basic tenets of the foreign policy of the new State of Pakistan were outlined by Quaid-i-Azma at a press conference in Delhi on 14 July 1947. He remarked that the new state “will be most friendly to all nations. We stand for the peace of the world. We will make our contribution whatever we can.”2 These ideas were further explicated on 15 August, when as Governor-General of Pakistan, the Quaid observed:

Our objective should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with world at large. We have no aggressive designs against any one. We stand by the United Nations Charter and will gladly make our contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.3

Prefiguring the doctrine of non-alignment, the Quaid-i-Azam, in his broadcast talk to the people of the USA in February 1948 said:

Our foreign policy is one of the friendliness and goodwill towards all the nation of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings, and are prepared to make our contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.4

Quaid-i-Azam World View

World views are those core elements of human belief systems which act as organizing principles for ordering the universe of our perceptions of the social environment. They are stable but historical in nature and always reflect subjective understanding of the objective reality. World views provide fundamental assumptions about knowledge and action. World views are of two types: rationalistic and non-rationalistic. The former emphasize order, clarity, empiricism and logical analysis while the latter revolve around “novelty, incongruity, intuition and subjective awareness.”5 At the heart of the rationalistic world view is the dualistic notion that reality is both fundamentally orderly and empirically available. Thus, “all things can be completely understood and explained by means of logical analysis and empirical inquiry…..Life can be shaped and directed in accordance with human objectives and aspirations.”6

The Quaid-i-Azam’s worldview may be characterized as rationalistic. Such a characterization is warranted by the fact that “Jinnah’s appeal to religion was always ambigious, certainly it was not characteristic of his political style before 1937, and evidence suggests that his use of the communal factor was a political tactic, not an ideological commitment”. (emphasis added).7 It undoubtedly had a normative component in that it was geared towards the realization of the idea of Pakistan. What type of state did Jinnah have in mind? His address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August, 1947 offers a perspective:

If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter what community he belongs, no matter, what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations there will be no end to the progress you will make. You should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas Khatris, also Bengalese, Madrasis, and so on – will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long ago….. You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are starting with the fundamental principle that we all are citizens and equal citizens of one State….8

The same ideas of justice, equality and fairness also informed the Quaid’s thinking and politics regarding international issues. For example, on the emotionally charged issue of the Khilafat in Turkey in 1920, Jinnah as a true constitutionalist, “derided the false and dangerous religious frenzy” of the zealots, both Hindu and Muslim” since it threatened the stability of the existing political structures and orderly progress along moderate and nationalist lines.9 In 1937, following the rejection by the Arabs of the Peel Commission proposal that Palestine should be divided into Arab and Jewish State, leaving Britain with a mandate over a reduced area which would include the holy place of Jerusalem, Quaid-i-Azam expressed strong support for the Arab position and called upon London to honour its pledge of total independence to the Arab people. In his Presidential address to the All India Muslim League delivered at Lucknow on 16 October 1937, the Quaid stated:

Great Britain has dishonored her proclamation to the Arabs which had guaranteed to them complete independence of the Arab homeland and the formation of an Arab Confederation under the stress of the Great War….May I point out to Great Britain that this question of Palestine, if not fairly and squarely met, boldy and courageously decided, is gong to be a turning point in the history of the British Empire…..The Muslims of India will stand solidly and will help the Arabs in every way they can in their brave and just struggle that they are carrying on against all odds.10

The Quaid-i-Azam vehemently opposed the partition of Palestine and the establishment of Israel in 1948. In an interview to Mr. Robert Stimson, B.B.C. correspondent on 19 December 1947, the Quaid said,”…. Our sense of justice obliges us to help the Arab cause in Palestine in every way that is open to us.”11 Similarly in his reply to a telegram from the King of Yemen on 24 December 1947, Quaid-i-Azam expressed his “surprise and shock” all the UN decision to approve of the partition of Palestine. Describing the division of Palestine as “outrageous and inherently unjust” the Quaid assured “the Arab brethren” that “Pakistan will stand by them in their opposition to the UNO decision.”12 Later, Quaid-i-Azam sent a cable to President Truman urging him to “uphold the rights of the Arabs” and thus “avoid the greatest consequences and repercussions.”13 The Quaid-i-Azam gave open and unflinching support to North African Arabs in their struggle to throw off the French yoke. He considered the Dutch attack upon Indonesia as an attack on Pakistan itself and refused transit facilities to Dutch ship and planes, carrying war material to Indonesia.”14 Similarly, Pakisan provided all possible “diplomatic and material assistance to the liberation movement in Indonesia, Malaya, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria and Algeria.”15

Pakistan’s Security Compulsions

Soon after its emergence as an independent nation on 14 August 1947 Pakistan was faced with a hostile security environment. The most serious threat to Pakistan’s security emanated from India which never reconciled itself to the idea of the partition of the subcontinent. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah too had strong reservations about the Radcliffe award which he characterized as “unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse.”16 This was mainly because the Punjab Boundary Commission had deprived Pakistan of “territories which, by all cannons of justice, should have gone to [it] – territories the possession of which enabled India to annex the Muslims majority states of Jammu and Kashmir.”17 Notwithstanding its unjust character, Quaid-i-Azam agreed to accept the decision of the Boundary Commission since as “honourable people” the Pakistan “had agreed to abide by it.”18 After the acceptance of the partition plan, Quaid-i-Azam expressed to the new India his friendly feelings and desire for full cooperation, even to the extent of “wishing for a joint defence plan.”19 Speaking at a Press Conference in New Delhi on 14 July 1947, he said that relations between India and Pakistan “will be friendly and cordial” since “being neighbours” “we can be of use to each other, not to say the world.”20 On August 15, 1947, as the first Governor General of Pakistan, the Quaid declared: “We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large.”21 But the Indian inablilty to accept the ineluctable reality of the partition of the British India ensured that these early Pakistani hopes for friendly ties with India were cut short giving rise to the pessimistic belief that Pakistan, in the words of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, had “been surrounded on all sides by forces which were to destroy her.”22 That the Indian leadership harboured grave reservations about the Partition Plan was evident from Jawaharlal Nehru’s following remarks: “The proposals to allow certain parts to secede if they so will is painful for any one of us to contemplate”.23 Expressing the similar view, the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee on the Paritition Plan, adopted on 15 June 1947 stated:

Geography and the mountains and the seas fashioned India as she is, and no human agency can change the shape or come in the way of her final destiny. Economic circumstances and the insistent demands of international affairs make the unity of India still more necessary. The picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and hearts. The A.I.C.C. earnestly trusts that when present passions have subsided, India’s problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of the two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all.24

In October 1947, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck reprted to the British Prime Minister Attlee: “The present Indian cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis.”25 In line with the policy of implacable hostility towards the new state of Pakistan, India forcibly occupied some Princely States in Kathiawar, which had acceded to Pakistan and secured accession of the State of Jammu Kashmir by manipulation. Further, it discontinued the supply of coal and withheld a part of Pakistan’s share in the cash balances, arms and equipment. The Indian Government failed to protect the lives and properties of a large number of Muslims and there was a heavy influx of Muslim refugees into Pakistan. In 1948 Pakistan fought the kashmir war and was faced with the prospect of Indian trying to “throttle and choke” it “at birth”.26 The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir stemmed mainly from the selective application of the principles on which partition was based. British India had 562 princely states which on the eve of the British departure were given the option to join either India or Pakistan in keeping with their geography and the will of their inhabitants. With the exception of three princely states Junagarh, Hyderabad and the State of Jammu and Kashmir the choice was a simple one as they had to simply follow the dictates of their Muslim or Hindu heritage. In each of these three states the ruling family belonged to one religious community and the great majority of the population to the other. And this anomalous situation posed special problems. In Junagadh and Hyderabad, Muslim princes rules over the Hindu majority.

Similarly, Pakistan was confronted with the security problems in the North-West also where Afghanistan had made irredentist claims. As early as November 1944, the Afghanistan Government, anticipating that the British would have to relinquish power in India, made the representation to London that the people of those areas of North-West Frontier which had been annexed to Indian during the last century should be offered option of becoming independent or rejoining Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Government was pressing for the acceptance of its demands when in 1946 the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, which was an ally of the Indian National Congress, raised the slogan of “Pakhtunistan.” The slogan then “signified an agitation or demands for independence of the Pathans of the North-West Frontier – Independence that is from Pakistan, should such a state come into being.” The Partition Plan provided that a referendum would be held in the North–West Frontier Province to ascertain whether the population of the area wanted to join Pakistan or India. The British Government rejected the Red Shirt proposal that there should also be an option for independence in the referendum as per coordination of 3 June 1947 plan.

The referendum was held in the NWFP in July 1947 without the requested addition of independence as an option for the Pashtuns. Out of the total electorate of 572,798 the valid votes cast for union with Pakistan were 289,244 while the remaining 2,074 were for union with India.27 The NWFP became part of Pakistan, on the basis of the referendum. The frontier States of Swat, Chitral, Dir and Amb also acceded to Pakistan, and the Tribal Jirgas of the frontier region opted for “attachment of the Tribal Agencies to Pakistan.”28 Afghanistan did not accept this arrangement whereas the British had to proceed to the Pakistan Plan agreed to between the British, Indian National Congress and All-India Muslim League. As follow up of the referendum the Quaid as Pakistan’s first Governor-General sacked Dr. Khan Sahib’s Ministry in the NWFP in the first week after the independence.

Afghanistan’s non-recognition of the NWFP and the Tribal Agencies as part of Pakistan coupled with the fact that Afghanistan was the only state that cast a negative vote on Pakistan’s application for membership to the UN in September 1947, caused a sense of deep resentment in Karachi. In November 1947, Najibullah Khan, special envoy of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, made three demands on Pakistan: “creation of free sovereign province’ comprising the tribal region; establishment of a corridor aeries West Baluchistan to give Afghanistan an access to the sea or, alternatively, granting a ‘free Afghan Zone’ in Karachi; and conclusion of a Pakistan Afganistan treaty specifically providing that either party could remain neutral in case the other party was attacked.”29

The hopes raised by Karachi talks of an amicable settlement of the Pakistan-Afghanistan difference proved to be unfounded. In June 1948 the Government of Pakistan arrested Abdul Ghaffar Khan and a score of other Pushtun leaders as a result of their subversive activities. These arrests were followed by the “intensification of Pakistani military action in the tribal areas (including the use of the air force against their tribal opponents.”30

The dilapidated condition of Pakistan’s armed forces31 and concern for its borders in the face of territorial disputes with its neighbours, India and Afghanistan, forced Karachi to turn away from South Asia for security assistance. Several other factors induced Karachi to look in the directions of the Western block, particularly the United States First. Pakistan’s ruling elite “hailing from the feudal and to some extend, commercial classes, the bureaucracy and the military” had a liking for the West due to its Western education and cultural outlook. The Quaid-i-Azam himself represented the best of Western education, throughout, cultural values and rationality. Secondly, Pakistan’s economy was integrated with the West, particularly Britain, during the colonial era and it would not have been easy to transform it along the socialist lines. Pakistan “preferred to have trading partners in the West because they were in a position to supply consumer goods at very competitive prices for local requirements and provided almost assured markets for Pakistan’s raw materials.”32 Thirdly, Pakistan expected strong Western diplomatic and political support from the United States and Great Britain in the settlement of its disputes with India. Finally, “the transfer of power by the British in the subcontinent to the Government of India and Pakistan had not brought about any immediate change in the Soviet opinion and, since the Soviet Union had apprehensions about the role of the decolonize nations in the world affairs, its own attitude was somewhat cool.”33

Barely two weeks after its inception, Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, during his informal talks wit the U.S. Charge d’Affairs, Chairles W. Lewis, Jr., sought capital and technical assistance for Pakistan on the ground that funds were needed to “meet the administrative approximately $2 billion over a period of five years. Immediately thereafter Pakistan submitted to the State Department the following breakdown of Pakistan’s requirement: $700 million for industrial development, $700 million for agricultural development and $510 million for building and equipping defense services. Further breakdown of the defence expenditure showed $170 million for the Navy and $205 million to meet the anticipated deficits in Pakistan’s military budget.34

These Pakistani appeals for urgent financial aid from Washington were greeted with vague promises bordering on ‘wait an see’ attitude. Several consideration underpinned this American reluctance to assume the role of a military benefactor for Karachi. The first was a continuation of Washington’s pre-independence desire to consult with London on matters of importance in South Asia. The second was Washington’s insistence on taking a regional approach to the areas which called for an evenhanded approach vis-à-vis controversies between Pakistan and India. The third factor was the American preoccupation with the European affairs and the consequent denigration of South Asia as an important strategic region. It was not until the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War a year later that the U.S. began to pay any serious heed to the South Asian region in terms of its emergent global strategy of the containment of the Communism.

Notes and References
  1. Saeeduddin Ahmed Dar, “Foreign Policy of Pakistan: 1947-48,” in Ahmed Hasan Dani, ed., World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Islamabad, 1979, p. 364.
  2. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948, Islamabad, 1989, p. 29.
  3. Ibid. pp. 55-56.
  4. Ibid. pp. 157-158.
  5. Miriam Steiner, “The Speech for Order in a disorderly world: Worldviews and Prescriptive decision paradigms”, International Organization, 37:3, 1983, p. 37.
  6. Ibid.
  7. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, 1948, p. 5.
  8. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Speeches, p.46.
  9. Jalal, pp. 8-9.
  10. Rizwan Ahmed, ed. Saying of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 1947), p. 86.
  11. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: speeches, p. 11.
  12. Ibid.
  13. Saeeduddin Ahmed Dar, “Foreign Policy of Pakistan: 1947-48,” in Ahmed Hasan Dani, ed., p. 362.
  14. S. Raza
  15. Ibid.
  16. Quoted in G.W. Choudhry, Pakistan’s Relations with India, 1947-1966, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 56.
  17. Ibid.
  18. Ibid.
  19. Ibid., p. 40.
  20. Saying of Quaid-i-Azam, op. cit., p. 80.
  21. Choudhry, Pakistan’s Relations with India, p. 41.
  22. Ibid., p. 41.
  23. Latif Ahmed Sherwani, ed, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947, Karachi, 1969, p. 235.
  24. Ibid., pp. 247-248.
  25. As cited in Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar, “Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-48,” in Ahmed Hasan Dani, ed., p. 363.
  26. 7 November 1947, Mountbatten’s Personal report as cited in Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, New York, 1984, pp. 352-353.
  27. Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider’s Account, Washington, 1988, p. 67.
  28. Ibid., p. 68.
  29. Mahboob A Popatia, Pakistan’s Relations with the Soviet Union 1947-49; Constraints and Compulsions, Karachi, 1988, p. 27.
  30. Ibid., p. 70.
  31. Mohammad Ayub Khan, the first Muslim Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army (1951-1958) and later Pakistan’s president (1958-1969) recalled Pakistan’s defence capability at the time in the following words:
    “Our army was badly equipped and terribly disorganized. It was almost immediately engaged in escorting the refugees who streamed by the million into Pakistan, and not long after that it was also involved in the fighting in the Kashmir. Throughout this period we have no properly organized units, no equipment, and hardly any ammunition. Our plight desperate. But from the moment Pakistan came into being I was certain of one thing Pakistan’s survival was vitally linked with the establishment of a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led army. I was determined to create this type of military shield for my country”. See Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, New York, 1967, pp. 20-21.
  32. Popatia, p. 29.
  33. Ibid.
  34. M.S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958, Lahore, 1984, pp. 15, 19-20.
by Syed Rifaat Hussain 

Quaid-e-Azam's Perception of Pakistan's Relations with India

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a peace loving person and wanted Pakistan to be a peace loving state with neutral and independent foreign policy. He wanted Pakistan to enter the arena of world politics with the pious hope of ‘peace within and peace without1. Even in his broadcast speech from All-India Radio on June 3, 1947, he appealed to all the communities of India particularly Muslims ‘to maintain peace and order2’ He had every respect for the United Nations and wanted the organization to work for the betterment of the mankind. He assured complete ‘material and moral support’ of Pakistan for ‘the oppressed and suppressed people of the world’. He made it clear that Pakistan, being a believer of ‘the principles of honesty and fairplay in national and international dealings’, would not support any ‘aggressive designs against any country or nation’3.

Quaid-i-Azam also intended to keep ‘friendly and cordial relations with the neighbouring countries4. He stated that Pakistan had ‘no aggressive design’ against its neighbours. About Indo-Pakistan relations he was of the view that the two nations should forget their past tensions and start a new era of peace and friendship. He wanted the two countries to be ‘of use to each other’5. He thought that the two countries will be needing a number of things from each other and can help each other ‘morally, materially and politically’ and thus could ‘raise the prestige and status of both Dominions’6. While congratulating Mr. C. Rajagopalachari on his appointment as Governor General of India the Quaid expressed a desire and expectation for ‘real friendship between the two Dominions’7.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah believed that once Pakistan achieves its goal of peace within and peace without, the two nations would be able to live in peace and harmony8. However, he wanted India to ‘shed the superiority complex’ and treat Pakistan on ‘equal footing’ and also to ‘fully appreciate the realities’9. At the time of departure from Delhi to Karachi on August 7, 1947. Quaid-i-Azam, in a statement, expressed his thanks to the people and leaders of India who expressed good wishes for the newly established dominion of Pakistan. At the same occasion he requested the people of Delhi to bury the past and to ‘start afresh as two independent sovereign States of Hindustan and Pakistan’. He also wished Hindustan ‘prosperity and peace’10. In his reply to Lord Mountbatten’s speech during the transfer of power ceremonies he sent a message of cheer and goodwill for India and also affirmed his faith in good neighbourly relations with her.11

The Quaid was interested in building a better future for the people of India and Pakistan. He wanted the people of the two countries to develop cordial relations based on the concept of mutual respect and co-existence.12 He considered it beneficial for both Pakistan and India if the two countries would cooperate with each other ‘for the purpose of playing their part in international affairs’. He went to the extent that Pakistan and India should enter in defence collaboration ‘both on land and sea against any aggression’. But he made it clear that it will only be possible if the two countries can ‘resolve their own differences’13. Quaid-i-Azam had, in fact, pleaded for a common defence policy between India and Pakistan as early as in April 194714.

Quaid-i-Azam assured that the government of Pakistan will take care of the ‘life and properties of the minorities’ living in Pakistan and ‘shall give them a fair deal15’. He advised the Muslims of India ‘to give unflinching loyalty to the state’ where they live. But in response to all these efforts on the part of the Muslims he hoped that the Indian Government would not act on the advice of ‘those who are bent upon the eviction or extermination of Muslims of India by brutal and inhuman methods’16.

The Quaid clearly visualized that the subcontinent being an organic unit called for a common defence strategy and also that if the two could effectively cooperate economically both would benefit. Pakistan as the meeting point of India and the Muslim Middle East could play an important role between the two regions17. The Quaid was also aware of the fact that the alliance between India and Soviet Union would have a direct impact on Pakistani economy18.

As late as the last week of April 1948, Quaid-i-Azam talked about good trade relations between India and Pakistan. However, he thought that it was only possible if the two countries enter into ‘normal international relations’. Subject to this condition he could envisage that India and Pakistan should reciprocate in providing ‘bonding facilities’ to each other at their respective ports, Calcutta and Karachi19.

Knowing the long history of difference between the two nations in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, there was a question in every mind as to whether the two countries will be able to enjoy good relations. They remembered with regency effect that only few months back Congress had sabotaged the Cabinet Mission Plan when after their premature jubilation, they came to provinces20. Despite the fact that Quaid-i-Azam had seen the Hindus very closely during the last fifty years, he was still hoping against hope that the partition providing independence and autonomy to both will change the attitudes which had prevailed for about a century since the establishment of the British Raj. He was almost certain that minorities in both the countries will enjoy every right in their respective countries and will be ‘made to feel that their life, property and honour are absolutely safe and secure’21. The Quaid, in the face of his sincerity and optimism, did not realize that the acceptance of partition by the Hindus was not a change of heart on their part but only a change of tactics.

Like most small countries, the foreign policy of Pakistan begins and ends at her borders, particularly at the Indian border. It has been dominated by the fear of Indian aggression. For Pakistan the problems began at the outset of its existence. The Quaid, with his rational mind, thought that the demands of both the Congress and the League had been met partially, though not fully, and the two states had emerged through an agreement, secured however reluctantly. So he reasoned that it was time for burying the hatchet and setting up the good neighbourly relations22. However, Indian attitude remained unchanged.

According to the Indian writers most of their leaders believed that India and Pakistan would be able to come closer and establish harmonious relations with each other. They hold that the biggest hurdle in the good relationship between the two countries was the ‘self imposed’ fear of Indian aggression in the minds of Pakistani leadership23. But a good look into the history of the period makes it clear that this fear was not ‘imaginary’. Hindu leaders of the Indian National Congress were on a different wave length. A large number of them considered the creation of a Muslim State in South Asia as a hurdle in achieving their dream of ‘Akhand Bharat’. On April 5, 1946, Nehru declared that ‘nothing on earth’ can bring ‘about Pakistan which Jinnah wants’24. Gandhi approximately a year later in March 1947 claimed that the Congress would only accept Pakistan ‘over my dead body’25.

The intentions of the Congress leadership became quite clear when they accepted the June 3 Plan with serious mental reservations. Hindus started propagating that Pakistan will not sustain for long and will breakdown sooner or later and at last will become a part of ‘Mother India’. Gandhi, commenting on the plan, declared Hindus and Muslims ‘interdependent on one another’ and predicted that Muslim League leadership ‘will ask to come back to Hindustan’ and Nehru ‘will take them back’26. In this broadcast of June 3, 1947, Nehru expressed his hope that probably in this way Hindus ‘shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise’.27 Nehru and Patel accepted the partition with the assumption that by conceding Pakistan to Jinnah they will get rid of him and thus, in the words of Nehru, ‘by cutting off the head we shall get rid of headache’28. The same viewpoint was promoted in most of the memoirs, diaries and books published by the Congress minded people in the last phase of the British Raj.

Hindu leaders kept expressing the same views even after the creation of Pakistan. Off and on, it was suggested that sooner or later sanity would return to the lesser of the two parallel streams and that they would converge to a point to make the roaring river of one united India29. However, Nehru and Krishna Menon had stated that Congress had accepted the partition only to get rid of the British30 30. On the event of the first independence day of India, Sardar Patel was sure that Pakistan would crash in a short period of time31 . J.B. Kripalani, the Congress President, remarked that the freedom they had achieved was not ‘complete without the unity of India’32 . A well known Indian newspaper Amrita Bazar Patrika reported that Gandhi had decided to retire from the active politics on August 15, 1947 and would do something for the Muslims of Pakistan so that he could ‘bring them into the union of India and to restore Indian unity’33.

The Pakistani leadership did not take these threats seriously. They believed that by such idle talks, the Congress leaders tried to hide their defeat at the hands of Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League. But it is a fact that had Congress leaders not been confident of the eventual collapse of Pakistan, they would have never ever agreed to its creation34. The Congress leaders believed that Pakistan was bound to collapse and thus tried to hasten the procedure.

Quaid-i-Azam did show his disappointment over the propaganda against the creation of Pakistan35. He said that the threats against the sovereignty of Pakistan, from the Congress leadership, will not ‘restore goodwill and friendly relations between the two states’. He also made it clear that Pakistan will ‘never surrender’ and will never accept any ‘constitutional reunion’ between the two dominions with ‘one common centre’. He was also sure that Pakistan was established to stay and ‘will stay’36.

It was not only limited to the expressed wishes of the Indian leaders but they infact did every thing they could to damage the independence of Pakistan. The Indians had a needling sense of frustration at having lost what they considered a natural part of mother India37. In a letter to the British Prime Minister, dated September 28, 1947, Field Martial Achinleck felt no hesitation in expressing his opinion that the Indian Cabinet was ‘determined to do all in their power’ to prohibit the ‘establishment of the dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis’. He also made it clear that Indian leaders, Cabinet Ministers, civil officials and others were also trying to ‘obstruct the work of partition of the Armed Forces’. He further expressed that the Indian Government was trying its best to ‘prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or indeed anything of arsenals and depots in India’38.

India took a series of measures to practically destroy the independence of the dominion of Pakistan. First step they took in this regard was their influence on the Radcliffe Award which was to demarcate the boundaries between the two countries. The Chairman of the Boundary Commission was openly accused of going beyond his terms of reference and the Award was universally condemned as territorial murder39.

Quaid-i-Azam declared the Radcliffe Award as ‘unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse’. He considered the Boundary Award as the ‘latest blow’ to the problems of Pakistan. He termed them as ‘political award’ and not judicial. Still he said that as ‘we have agreed to abide by it’ as ‘honourable people we must abide by it’40. Though Pakistan and particularly Punjab suffered a lot from these awards. Yet, it wad due to the hold of the Quaid over his people that they accepted the awards without reservation and did not agitate against it41.

It was expected that the partition of the sub continent will solve the major problems of the two communities living in the region and that both the countries will accommodate their respective minorities as an integral part of their nation. But the Hindus, who were not prepared to see an independent Muslim state in South Asia, started large scale anti-Muslim riots with the help of the government. The Hindus started killing Muslims and setting their houses and property on fire. The massacre of Muslims took place throughout India but the condition of East Punjab, the city of Delhi and Ajmair was the worst42. The modern history had never witnessed such a large scale communal murder. It was nothing less than a war against the Muslim minority of East Punjab and in a number of adjoining princely states43.

Due to the communal riots in India at the time of partition, a large scale migration took place in which millions of Muslims were forced to leave their homes in India. During these riots thousands of Muslims lost their lives while millions were forced to migrate to Pakistan. Within a period of six or seven weeks between August 1, and September 20, 1947, nearly half a million Muslims were killed44. Lord Ismay, the Viceroy’s chief of staff, told the Quaid that ‘Delhi itself was on the verge of chaos, Muslims were systematically hunted down and butchered’. Quaid-i-Azam was shocked when he asked, ‘How could any civilized government permit such a state of affairs?45.

The Quaid, in his message to the nation on the occasion of Eid, said that the joy of the day was ‘overshadowed by the suffering and sorrow of 5 million Muslims in East Punjab and its neighbourhood’46. He condemned the Hindu attitude of compelling the Muslims of India to ‘declare their folly’ for supporting Pakistan and believing in the ‘fantastic two nation theory47. He believed that a certain section in India was determined to ‘drive Muslims from the entire Dominion by making life impossible for them’48. He appealed to all the Muslims of the world for ‘brotherly sympathy, support and cooperation’ for the Muslims of India49. Quaid-i-Azam also approached the Commonwealth countries for help in ending the murderous raids on the trains and columns of refugees50.

Quaid-i-Azam was very much concerned about the Muslims in India. He was personally following the latest developments and was well aware of the fact that many of them were living ‘as worse than prisoners’. He tried to do his best to have a ‘constant communication’ with the Indian Government’ on the subject’. He hoped and wished that the authorities in India will do ‘every thing possible’ for the ‘safety and the welfare of the Muslims’ and Indian government will deal with the people responsible for all those happenings ‘with the iron hand’51. The Quaid called upon the Indian Government not to penalize the Muslims of India ‘for their help and sympathy for the establishment of Pakistan’ 52. He said if the ‘ultimate solution of the minority problem’ was ‘mass exchange of population’ then it should be done according to the ‘Government plan’ and should not be left to ‘be sorted out by bloodthirsty elements’53.

Instead of what was happening in East Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam urged the Muslims of West Punjab to secure the protection of minorities as a sacred undertaking in accordance with the teachings of Islam54. He considered it a matter of prestige and honour to ‘safeguard the lives’ of the minority communities and to create a ‘sense of security among them’55. He said that Pakistan was to ‘maintain peace, law and order’ and would safeguard every citizen of Pakistan regardless of ‘caste, creed or community’56. In his broadcast speech from Radio Pakistan, Dacca on March 28, 1948 he congratulated the people of the province for their good treatment with the Hindu minorities57.

In conspiracy with and under the active guidance of Mountbatten, the Indian government launched upon a military grab of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which should have constituted an integral part of Pakistan58. Indian occupation of Kashmir was not only an emotional setback but was also a threat to Pakistan’s defence, communication and economy59. Pakistanis considered Kashmir as the life line of Pakistan. According to G.W. Choudhry, ‘To a Pakistani, Kashmir is not a remote and unknown country; it is near and dear and vital: near in geography; dear in religion; vital in strategy’60.

When Maharaja through a deal announced the accession of the State to India on the 27th of October 1947, Quaid-i-Azam on the very next day ordered the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, Lt. Gen. Sir D. Gracy to invade Kashmir61. Commander-in-Chief referred the matter to Field Marshal Auchinleck. Auchinleck asked Quaid-i-Azam to take his orders back otherwise all the British officers from both the armies would resign62, which Pakistan could not afford at that time.

Moreover, Quaid-i-Azam planned a conference between Governor-Generals and Prime Ministers of the two Dominions which could not take place due to the illness of Nehru and reluctance of Patel to talk with Pakistani Leaders63. However a meeting was held between the two Governor-Generals: Quaid-i-Azam and Mountbatten, at Lahore on November 1, 1947. In this meeting the former called for a cease-fire in Kashmir with forty eight hours as well as the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Indian troops from the state. He also proposed that the two Governor-Generals should be vested with full powers by the government of Pakistan and India to restore peace, undertake the administration of the state and arrange a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision64. Mountbatten gave no reply at that time. However, he turned down all the proposals after consulting Indian cabinet65.

On the contrary Indian Defence Minister announced in the Indian parliament that Indian army would launch a major offensive in Kashmir. Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, Sir Gracy made it clear that Indian army will not be allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naoshera66. It was in early May 1948 that Pakistan government, with the recommendations of Quaid-i-Azam and the Commander-in-Chief, sent a limited number of troops to Kashmir to hold certain defensive positions and prevent the Indian army from advancing to the borders of Pakistan67.

Pakistan’s representative in the Security Council made it clear that the Pakistan government has not accepted and cannot accept the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India. In their view the accession was based on violence and fraud68. Quaid-i-Azam was himself monitoring the activities in the Security Council and was interested in getting the information about the latest developments on regular basis69.

There were a few other irritants which created bad blood between the two countries. These related to distribution of financial assets, working of the Reserve Bank of India, distribution of military stores and adjustment of trade relations70. The economy of Pakistan which was already in flex was further damaged by the Indian refusal to pay her due share. Pakistan which was to get Rs. 75 crore, was given only Rs 20 crore and the Indian Government said that the rest of the Rs. 55 crore will be given after the satisfactory solution of the Kashmir affair71. Indian Government made the undeclared war between India and Pakistan as an excuse for withholding the supplies of arms to Pakistan72.

As an upper riparian power, it was India’s international obligation to ensure that Pakistan received its legitimate share of the waters. But India threatened unilateral stoppage of supplies to Pakistan and maintained that it has exclusive rights over the water of the rivers. It was a claim that could not be sustained either on the basis of prior appropriation or equitable distribution73. As the majority of the trade of the areas included in Pakistan was dependent on the areas included in India, a Standstill Agreement was signed between the two countries providing no restriction on the free flow of goods between the two dominions and no trade or custom barrier would be set up74.

By doing all these activities, the Indian leaders predicted that Pakistan would be left bankrupt and what they failed to achieve through fire and sword, would be brought about by ruining the finances of the State. They were sure that Pakistan will not be able to counter the economic invasion because the liquid financial resources of the country had touched its lowest level75. Quaid-i-Azam felt that imposition of customs on the borders would ‘involve the Hindu business community’ of Pakistan ‘in serious economic difficulties’ and thus many Hindu businessmen would remove ‘their business to the Indian Dominion’. The Quaid promised, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, all possible steps ‘for the protection of their well being’ and asked them not to leave their ‘ancestral homes in East Bengal for an unknown fate in the Indian Union’76.

Talking about the difficulties like ‘withholding by India of our cash balances, of our share of military equipment and lately, the institution of an almost complete economic blockade’ the Quaid was sure that ‘all right-thinking men’ in India ‘deplore these happenings’ and predicted that the ‘mind that has been responsible for them’ will be changed77. He said that the external elements were also ‘encouraging provincialism in the hope of weakening Pakistan’ and trying for re-absorption of East Pakistan ‘into the Indian dominion’. He made it clear that those who were involved in those activities were ‘living in a fool’s paradise’78.

Quaid-i-Azam believed in honesty, justice and fairplay in every sphere of life. He practiced these principles and expected the others to follow. No wonder that inspite of India’s repeated attempts to harm Pakistan the Quaid remained optimistic. In his letter to M.A.H. Isphahani in June 1948, Quaid-i-Aam hoped that Pakistan will be able to solve all its problems because her cause was righteous and she was facing them ‘with honesty’ and was fighting for ‘justice and fairplay’.79.

The long series of grave and disturbing developments preceding and immediately following the emergence of Pakistan, were certain to cast their ominous shadow on the future relations between the two countries80. Had India formally accepted Pakistan as a living reality from the core of its heart the tensions between the Muslims and the Hindus of South Asia would have been buried in 1947. It is what was desired by the Quaid, who was keenly interested in strengthening human relations between the people of both countries81. Had the Quaid’s dream of co-cooperative Pak-India relations been materialized, the region would never have been a scene of conflicts.

Notes and References
  1. Speech at the inauguration of the Pakistan Broadcasting Service, Karachi: August 15, 1947 in Rafique Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Lahore Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), p. 429.
  2. Broadcast Speech from All India Radio, New Delhi: June 3, 1947 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan (Islamabad: Services Book Club, 1989) p. 13.
  3. Broadcast talk to the People of the United States of America: February 1948 in ibid., p. 158.
  4. Speech at the inauguration of the Pakistan Broadcasting service, Karachi: August 15, 1947 in Rafique Afzal, ed. Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 429.
  5. Press Conference at New Delhi: July 14, 1947 in ibid., p. 423.
  6. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter: October 25, 1947, in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 82.
  7. Message to Mr. C. Rajagopalachari on his appointment as the Governor General of the Indian Dominion: May 5, 1948 in Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 464.
  8. Z.A. Suleri, My Leader (Lahore: Publishers Progressive Papers Ltd., 1982), p. 290.
  9. Interview to De Eric Streiff, Correspondent of Neue Zurcher Zeitung: March 11, 1948 in Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 459.
  10. Statement on the Eve of his departure for Karachi: August 7, 1947 in ibid., p.428.
  11. Sharif a Mujahid, ‘India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis’, in Latif Ahmed Sherwani,, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Analysis (Karachi: The Allies Book Corporation, 1954) p. 32.
  12. Riaz Ahmad, Quaid-i-Azam’s Perception of Islam and Pakistan (Rawalpindi: Alvi Publishers, 1990), p.115.
  13. Interview to De Eric Streiff, Correspondent of Neue Zurcher Zeitung: March 11, 1948 in Afzal, ed., Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, p. 459.
  14. Deccan Times, August 10, 1947, quoted in Sharif al Mujahid, ‘India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis’, p. 32.
  15. Address to Civil, Naval, Military & Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi: October 11, 1947 in Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976), p. 420.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Suleri, My Leader, p. 291.
  18. Ibid., p. 292.
  19. Speech in reply to the Address presented by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce: April 27, 1948 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 252.
  20. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 32.
  21. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter: October 25, 1947, in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements AS Governor General of Pakistan, p. 82.
  22. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 31.
  23. Kalim Bahadur, ‘India and Pakistan’, in Verinder Gover, ed., International Relations and the Foreign Policy of India Vol. II (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1992), p. 684.
  24. E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, p. 78 quoted S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 57.
  25. Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 218.
  26. New York Herald Tribune (New York, June 5, 1947).
  27. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide (London: Hutchinson, 1969) p. 315.
  28. Allan Campbell-Jonson, Mission with Mountbatten, p. 98, quoted S.K. Majumdar, Jinnah and Gandhi (Lahore: People’s Publishing House, 1976), p. 259.
  29. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 33.
  30. Statesman, October 14, 1947 quoted in S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 9.
  31. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.242.
  32. ‘Troubled India and Her Neighbors’, Foreign Affairs (New York, January, 1965), p. 319.
  33. New York Times, August 8, 1947, quoted Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy, p. 58.
  34. Sharif al Mujahid, India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis, p. 33.
  35. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter October 25, 1947, in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 82.
  36. Ibid., p. 83.
  37. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy, p. 56.
  38. Aziz Beg, Pakistan Faces India (Lahore: Babur and Amer Publications, n.d.), p. 56.
  39. Ibid., p. 52.
  40. Broadcast Speech from Radio Pakistan, Lahore: October 30, 1947 as in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 97.
  41. G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 56.
  42. Hameed A.K. Rai, ‘India’s Policy Towards Pakistan’, in Hameed A.K. Rai, ed., Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Vol. I (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, n.d.), p. 314.
  43. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, p. 41.
  44. Ibid., p. 42.
  45. Lord Ismay, Memories, p. 436 quoted in ibid., p. 43.
  46. Message to the Nation on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha: October 24, 1947 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 80.
  47. Interview to Duncan Hooper, Correspondent of Reuter: October 25, 1947, in ibid., p. 83.
  48. Address to Civil, Naval, Military & Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi: October 11, 1947 in ibid., p. 77.
  49. Message to the Nation on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha: October 24, 1947 in ibid., p. 80.
  50. Burke and Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, p. 48.
  51. Statement issued on September 15, 1947 in Afzal, ed. Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, pp. 436-37.
  52. Riaz, Quaid-i-Azam’s Perception of Islam and Pakistan, p. 118.
  53. Address to Civil, Naval, Military & Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi: October 11, 1947 in Jamil, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II, p. 420.
  54. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, p. 44.
  55. Speech at a Rally at the University Stadium, Lahore: October 30, 1947 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, p. 95.
  56. Speech at a public meeting at Dacca: March 21, 1948 in ibid., p. 180.
  57. Broadcast speech from Radio Pakistan, Dacca: March 28, 1948 in ibid., p. 210.
  58. Suleri, My Leader, p. 291.
  59. Choudhury, Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, p. 90.
  60. ibid., p. 91.
  61. ibid., p. 103.
  62. Alastair Lamb, Birth of Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 99.
  63. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 159.
  64. Sibtain Tahira, Kashmir and the United Nations (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1990), p. 28.
  65. Alafuddin Turabi, Tehrik-i-Azadi-i-Kashmir Manzil Ba Manzil (Lahore: Al Badr Publications. 1992), p. 77.
  66. Major Iqbal Hashmi, The Bleeding Kashmir (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1993), p. 73.
  67. Turabi, Tehrik-i-Azadi-i-Kashmir Manzil Ba Manzil, p. 105.
  68. Hashmi, The Bleeding Kashmir, p. 70.
  69. M.A.H. Ispahani, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1976), p. 268.
  70. S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pak Realtions: Tashkent to Simla Agreement (new Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1981), p. 20.
  71. Beg, Pakistan Faces India, p. 58.
  72. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations Tashkent to Simla Agreement, p. 21.
  73. Mushtaq Ahmad, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1968), p. 20.
  74. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent, to Simla Agreement, p. 21.
  75. Beg, Pakistan Faces India, p. 57.
  76. Broadcst speech from Radio Pakistan, Decca: March 28, 1948 in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements As Governor General of Pakistan, pp. 210-11.
  77. Speech at the Dacca University Convocation: March 24, 1948 in ibid., p. 193.
  78. Ibid.
  79. Quaid-i-Azam’s letter to Mr. Hasan Ispahani from Quetta June 14, 1948 in Ispahani, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: As I Knew Him, p. 272.
  80. Mushtaq, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 15.
  81. Riaz, Quaid-i-Azam’s Perception of Islam and Pakistan, p. 121.
>> by Farooq Ahmad Dar

Quaid-e-Azam and the youth

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the outstanding leader and a visionary statesman created this nation state of Pakistan by legal and constitutional means, with the power of the pen, speech and vote. To understand Pakistan, the reasons which led to its creation, what Pakistan stood for and was intended to accomplish, one has to understand Jinnah.

From an early age Jinnah displayed a remarkable interest in the life and conditions around him. The small world around him was the object of his interest and public events were the books he studied. At the young age of 16, he left for England to establish commercial connections in London but later he enrolled himself at the Lincolns Inn and began preparing for the Bar. He was called to the Bar at 21 and in the same year he returned to India.

As a barrister and advocate, Jinnah holds a place which is unique in the subcontinent. Great lawyers and men many years his senior acknowledged him as a master in the art of advocacy. He had the remarkable ability of making the most complex of facts look simple and obvious. He could be furiously aggressive or almost boyishly persuasive as the occasion demanded.

He possessed a remarkably clear mind and an abundance of commonsense, which is the most uncommon of qualities. Even those who disliked or disagreed with his convictions acknowledged and applauded him for maintaining the highest traditions at the Bar. He always kept away from the heat of controversies, intrigues and squabbles.

The abilities which led him to success in the legal world also suited a political career. Being endowed with qualities, such as a heart fired up by great fervour and sincerity, a clear vision and intellect, he was destined to play a prominent part in politics. With unusual powers of persuasion, luminous exposition, searching arguments and a sound judgment, he earned for himself an enviable reputation as a great debater.

Jinnah has often been referred to as brilliant and arrogant, and there is no denying the fact that he made no effort to socialise with those with whom he had little in common. He was formal and reserved in his dealings and never gave into emotions or sentiments. The overall picture of Jinnah as reflected by leaders of the subcontinent reveals that he was a man of unquestionable integrity, honesty, honour and unwavering belief in principles. His commitment to a cause he took up was definite and permanent. He spoke openly and fearlessly against discrimination, communalism, sectarianism, parochialism and believed in the separation of religion from the affairs of the state.

Advice to students

Jinnah placed great importance on the youth and gave his advice to students on several occasions. At a public meeting in Dhaka on March 21, 1948, he said:

“My young friends, students who are present here, let me tell you as one who has always had love and affection for you, who has served you for ten years faithfully and loyally, let me give you this word of warning: you will be making the greatest mistake if you allow yourself to be exploited by one political party or another…. Your main occupation should be — in fairness to yourself, in fairness to your parents, in fairness to the state – to devote your attention to your studies.”

Leaders of tomorrow

Addressing the Punjabi Muslim Students Federation at Lahore on October 31, 1947, Jinnah said:

“Pakistan is proud of her youth, particularly the students who have always been in the forefront in the hour of trial and need. You are the nation’s leaders of tomorrow and you must fully equip yourself by discipline, education and training for the arduous task lying ahead of you. You should realise the magnitude of your responsibility and be ready to bear it.”

Education policy

In a message to the All Pakistan Educational Conference in Karachi on November 27, 1948, Jinnah said that the education policy in Pakistan must be moulded on lines suited to our people, consonant with our history and culture, and having regard to modern conditions and vast development that has taken place all over the world. He said:

“What we have to do is to mobilise our people and build up the character of our future generation. In short, this means the highest sense of honour, integrity, selfless service to the nation and sense of responsibility, and we have to see that our people are fully qualified and equipped to play their part in the various branches of economic life in a manner which will do honour to Pakistan.”


Jinnah always spoke in favour of equality, fraternity, human rights, rights of minorities, justice, freedom, integrity and fair play. He very clearly stated that Pakistan was not going to be a theocratic state as Islam demands from us tolerance of other creeds and we welcome the closest association of all those who are willing and ready to play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan.

A moral and intellectual achievement

Jinnah called Pakistan a moral and intellectual achievement. He called upon Pakistanis on August 31, 1947, to build, reconstruct and re-generate our great nation. He said:

“It is in your hands, we undoubtedly have talents, Pakistan is blessed with enormous resources and potential. Providence has endowed us with all the wealth of nature and now it lies with man to make the best of it.”

Discipline and unity

In his speech at the Dhaka University in 1948, Jinnah said: “Freedom which we have achieved does not mean licence. It does not mean that you can behave as you please and do what you like irrespective of the interest of other people or of the state. A great responsibility rests on you and now more than ever, it is necessary for us to work as a united, disciplined nation. What is required of us all is a constructive spirit and not a militant spirit. It is far more difficult to construct than to have a militant spirit. It is easier to go to jail or fight for freedom than to run a government. Thwarted in their desire to prevent the establishment of Pakistan, our enemies turned their attention to finding ways to weaken and destroy us but they have been disappointed. Not only has Pakistan survived the shock of the upheaval but it has emerged stronger and better equipped than ever.”

We are all Pakistanis

In a reply to the civic address presented by the Quetta Municipality, Jinnah said:

“We are now all Pakistanis – not Baloch, Pathans, Sindhis, Bengalis, Punjabis and so on, and as Pakistanis you must feel, behave and act and you should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing else.”

Jinnah’s Pakistan

Pakistan, with its strategic geographical location and an impressive population of 170 million people, a large majority of this being the youth of Pakistan waiting to be moulded in the right direction to peace, progress and prosperity, has been battling for its survival for quite some time. We need to develop leadership in Pakistan in the role model of Jinnah at all levels in the country.

Nations that forget or ignore the teachings and guidelines of their founding fathers are often doomed to disaster and end up as failed states. There is urgent need for our youth to read and understand the principles, ideals, values and vision of our founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and ensure that we achieve and have for all times to come “Jinnah’s Pakistan”.

The author is a grand-nephew of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He is the author of several publications on Jinnah, and was conferred Sitara-i-Imtiaz for public service in education and health.

source: Dawn

Another picture of Miss Dina at Hampstead in 1931

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Miss Dina Jinnah - beloved daughter of Mr Jinnah

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I Beg Your Pardon - I Never Promised You A Rose Garden

originally uploaded by Doc Kazi.
Mr Jinnah deliberating whether or not to pluck a rose. He had a dream - we all combined to mess it up.

Quaid-e-Azam's last public appearance on 1 July 1948 at the opening of the State Bank of Pakistan

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"You might lose the whole of Pakistan" - Mountbatten yelled at Jinnah

Despite Mountbatten's insistence to be Governor General of both India and Pakistan, Mr Jinnah refused him the honour in Pakistan. Earlier the earl asked him, Do you know what this might cost him. Jinnah replied a few thousand square miles. Mountbatten went red in the face and replied You might lose the whole of Pakistan! True to his word he took every step to strangle Pakistan in its infancy. He fell victim to a IRA bomb while yachting with his family in 1979. Here both the Governors General are seen in the constitutent assembly of Pakistan in Karachi on 14 August 1947 and their body language says it all!

Mr. Jinnah with Lord Pethick Lawrence and Mr A V Alexander

originally uploaded by Doc Kazi.
The Cabinet Mission came to India in 1946 but could not achieve a consensus and failed miserably. Its chief quickly acquired the name Lord 'Pathetic' Lawrence

The 3rd June Plan - Nehru, Mountbatten and Jinnah

originally uploaded by Doc Kazi.
On 3 June 1947 all the Indian leaders got together and put their seal on the Partition Plan. Seated by the map on the wall is Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's Chief of Staff who probably tampered with the Radcliffe Award and gave Gurdaspur to India to keep the two new countries in a perpetual state of war over Kashmir till eternity!

Quaid-e-Azam meeting supporters at Quetta Railway Station in 1945

originally uploaded by Doc Kazi.
Perhaps the first 'Train March' in our history

Nations are born in the hearts of poets!!!

The poetry of Allama Iqbal was a breath of fresh air throughout Pakistan Movement... ...This is the historical and extremely memorable pic o...