Statement Regarding Killing In The Minority Province New Delhi: Nov 3, 1946

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League has issued the following statement to the press:

“I have been receiving reports of very grave and serious character of killing and destruction of property from the Muslim minority provinces such as Bihar, U.P., C.P., Madras and Bombay and I assure the Muslims of minority provinces that it was not due to indifferent or neglect that I have been queit. The matter is receiving my most careful attention and consideration.

Enquiries by the League

“It was arranged that four members of the Interior Central Government should go to Patna. Besides Mr. Muhammad Nauman, M.L.A. (Central) has been deputed by the Muslim League Party in the Central Assembly to go to Bihar and enquiries are being made with regard to those parts of U.P., C.P., Bihar, Madras and Bombay where disturbances have taken place, including East Bengal and Calcutta.

“I shall await the reports of our representatives Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar on their arrival here. I naturally am very deeply grieved to hear of the brutal and outrageous happenings. At present I can only ask the Muslims to remain calm and peaceful and bear it with patience, however aggressive or provocative may be the attitude of other people”.

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Source: South Asian Studies: bi-annual Research Journal, Vol.17, No. 1 (Quaid-i-Azam Number) January 2002, PP. 80 Also cited in Dawn, November 3, 1946.

Quaid-e-Azam in a reception in India House, London in 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam advising the press about his talks with the Cabinet Mission, 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam with his party's working committee - 1946

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The Cabinet Mission holds talks with the Quaid - 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam with Liaquat Ali Khan - London, 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam at the Muslim League Session, Bombay 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam with the Old Guards, Delhi 1946

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Sir Stafford Cripps with Quaid-e-Azam in 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam in his Dehli study, 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan on the way back from London, 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam M.A. Jinnah proceeding towards an Eid gathering in Bombay, 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam’s Fight Against Death

Quaid-e-Azam M.A. Jinnah had known in 1946 that he didn’t have more than a year to live. This was not any kind of premonition. It was the considered opinion of his physician in Paris who had come to this conclusion on the basis of Quaid’s five X-ray reports,-- reports that were kept like a closely guarded secret, to safeguard its leakage to the British intelligence. According to the physician’s opinion the deadly disease from which the Quaid suffered would not allow him more than one year.

These revelations are made in a recently published book “The Story of Partition” written by two eminent French authors who traveled some 2.5 lakh meters to collect the material for the book. The research took them four years during which period they interviewed as many as 2,500 persons belonging to the pre-partition era.

The Quaid’s physician in Paris is reported to have told the authors that he had to keep a round the clock vigil to ensure that the x-ray films did not fall into the hands of the Britishers, who might use the Quaid’s disease to change the whole complexion of the political situation in the sub-continent.

The year 1946, it may be recalled, was the most eventful year engagement with the fast changing course of events, together with the brightening of the prospects of victory, exerted enormous physical and mental strains on the Quaid. It was he alone to whom the people looked for guidance and inspiration.

Quaid-e-Azam proceeds to the Viceregal Lodge Simla, 1946

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Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah addressing a press conference in London, 1946

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Jawaharlal Nehru with Quaid-e-Azam in Simla, 1946

Quaid-e-Azam described Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru as “the impetuous Pandit who never unlearns or learns anything and never grows old”. He summed up his observations “Pandit Nehru is nothing but Peter Pan.”

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Quaid-e-Azam meeting the Viceroy Lord Wavell in 1946

Mr. Jinnah with Lord Pethick Lawrence and Mr A V Alexander

originally uploaded by Doc Kazi.

The Cabinet Mission came to India in 1946 but could not achieve a consensus and failed miserably. Its chief quickly acquired the name Lord 'Pathetic' Lawrence

The Plan of June 3, 1947

The plan for the transfer of power to which all concerned had agreed, was authoritatively announced by the British Government in the form of a statement on June 3, by Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons and Secretary of State for India the Earl of Listowel in the House of Lords.

The existing Constituent Assembly would continue to function but any constitution framed by it could not apply to those parts of the country which were unwilling to accept it. The procedure outlined in the statement was designed to ascertain the wishes of such unwilling parts on the question whether their constitution was to be framed by the existing Constituent Assembly or by a new and separate Constituent Assembly. After this had been done, it would be possible to determine the authority or authorities to whom power should be transferred.

The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab (excluding the European members) will therefore each be asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the Province.

The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of partition, division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.

For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will sit in two parts according to Muslim majority districts and non-Muslim majority districts. This is only a preliminary step of a purely temporary nature as it is evident that for the purposes of final partition of these Provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions will be needed; and, as soon as a decision involving partition has been taken for either Province, a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in consultation with those concerned.

Moreover, it was stated that the Legislative Assembly of Sindh was similarly authorized to decide at a special meeting whether the province wished to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly or to join the new one. If the partition of the Punjab was decided , a referendum would be held in the North-West Frontier Province to ascertain which Constituent Assembly they wished to join. Baluchistan would also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position and the Governor General was examining how this could be most appropriately done.

In his broadcast, Mountbatten regretted that it had been impossible to obtain the agreement of Indian leaders either on the Cabinet Mission plan or any other plan that would have preserved the unity of India. But there could be no question of coercing any large area in which one community had a majority to live against their will under a government in which another community had a majority. The only alternative to coercion was partition.

On the morning of June 4, the Viceroy held a press conference and said for the first time publically that the transfer of power could take place on "about 15 August" 1947.

The Council of the All India Muslim League met in New Delhi on 9th and 10th of June 1947 and stated in its resolution that although it could not agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab to give its consent to such partition, it had to consider the plan for the transfer of power as a whole. It gave full authority to the Quaid-i-Azam to accept the fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise and left it to him to work out the details.

The All India Congress Committee passed a resolution on June 15 accepting the 3rd June plan. However, it expressed the hope that India would one day be reunited.

The Interim Government (1946)

Wavell wrote identical letters to Nehru and Jinnah on July 22, 1946 asking them whether the Congress and the Muslim League would be prepared to enter an interim government on the basis that six members(including one Scheduled Caste representative) would be nominated by the Congress and five by the Muslim League. Three representatives of the minorities would be nominated by the Viceroy. Jinnah replied that the proposal was not acceptable to the Muslim League because it destroyed the principal of parity. At Nehru's invitation, he and Jinnah conferred together on August 15 but could not come to an agreement on the question of the Congress joining the interim government.

The Working Committee of the Muslim League had decided in the meantime that Friday 16 August, 1946 would be marked as the 'Direct Action Day".There was serious trouble in Calcutta and some rioting in Sylhet on that day. The casualty figures in Calcutta during the period of 16-19 August were 4,000 dead and 10,000 injured. In his letter to Pethick-Lawrence, Wavell had reported that appreciably more Muslims than Hindus had been killed. The "Great Calcutta Killing" marked the start of the bloodiest phase of the "war of succession" between the Hindus and the Muslims and it became increasingly difficult for the British to retain control. Now, they had to cope with the Congress civil disobedience movement as well as furious Muslims that had also come out in the streets in thousands.

The negotiations with the League reached a deadlock and the Viceroy decided to form an interim government with the Congress alone, leaving the door open for the League to come in later. A communiqué was issued on August 24 which announced that the existing members of the Governor General's Executive Council had resigned and that on their places new persons had been appointed. It was stated that the interim government would be installed on September 2.

Jinnah declared two days later that the Viceroy had struck a severe blow to Indian Muslims and had added insult to injury by nominating three Muslims who did not command the confidence of Muslims of India. He reiterated that the only solution to Indian problem was the division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan. The formation of an interim government consisting only of the Congress nominees added further fuel to the communal fire. The Muslims regarded the formation of the interim government as an unconditional surrender of power to the Hindus, and feared that the Governor General would be unable to prevent the Hindus from using their newly acquired power of suppressing Muslims all over India.

After the Congress had taken the reins at the Center on September 2, Jinnah faced a desperate situation. The armed forces were predominantly Hindu and Sikh and the Indian members of the other services were also predominantly Hindu. The British were preparing to concede independence to India if they withdrew the Congress was to be in undisputed control, the Congress was to be free to deal with the Muslims as it wished. Wavell too, felt unhappy at the purely Congress interim government. He genuinely desired a Hindu-Muslim settlement and united India, and had worked hard for that end.

Wavell pleaded with Nehru and Gandhi, in separate interviews, that it would help him to persuade Jinnah to cooperate if they could give him an assurance that the Congress would not insist on nominating a Nationalist Muslim. Both of them refused to give way on that issue.Wavell informed Jinnah two days later that he had not succeeded in persuading the Congress leaders to make a gesture by not appointing a Nationalist Muslim. Jinnah realized that the Congress would not give up the right to nominate a Nationalist Muslim and that he would have to accept the position if he did not wish to leave the interim government solely in the hands of the Congress. On October 13, he wrote to Wavell that, though the Muslim League did not agree with much that had happened, "in the interests of the Muslims and other communities it will be fatal to leave the entire field of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress". The League had therefore decided to nominate five members for the interim government. On October 15, he gave the Viceroy the following five names:

Liaquat Ali Khan, I.I Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Jogindar Nath Mandal. The last name was a Scheduled Caste Hindu and was obviously a tit-for-tat for the Congress insistence upon including a Nationalist Muslim in its own quota.

• External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations:  Jawaharlal Nehru

• Defence: Baldev Singh

• Home (including Information and Broadcasting): Vallahbhai Patel

• Finance: Liaquat Ali Khan

• Posts and Air: Abdur Rab Nishtar

• Food and Agriculture: Rajendra Parsad

• Labor: Ragjivan Ram

• Transport and Railways: M.Asaf Ali

• Industries and Supplies: John Matthai

• Education and Arts: C. Rajgopalacharia

• Works, Mines and Power: C.H. Babha

• Commerce: I.I. Chundrigar

• Law: Jogindar Nath Mandal

• Health: Ghazanfar Ali Khan